A writer’s manifesto

The business model for writing is designed to make you feel bad about yourself.

Before Fernwood published Siegebreakers, I was so desperate to “get published” as a fiction writer that I followed every piece of advice I found in books and online, even advice that was self-contradictory. 

One piece of advice, for example, about twenty years ago, was to never submit manuscripts to publishers directly. You had to find a reputable literary agent, and most publishers only looked at work from agents. So, I looked at more online resources, bought various Writer’s Market publications, and started a process of desperation and supplication to get the attention of a literary agent. 

It worked well: Instead of racking up rejections from publishers, I was racking up rejections from agents, which led to ever weirder experiences. One agent said he liked my submission, scheduled a phone call for months later, and ghosted me after the phone call (I guess there was something he didn’t like). It seemed agents liked to be polite, so they would rather find ways to politely ghost you than to write the kind of rejection letters academics are used to getting from journals (“a rather pedestrian study”, was the favorite rejection comment I got for one of my early scientific papers). 

But one rejection was maximally revealing about the state of the world for writers. One agency rejected me after the standard 12 weeks, then put me on a mailing list for one of the courses they run for writers on how to get published! There are literary agencies out there that make money off of courses teaching writers how to increase their chances of getting published. What’s even worse: years later, I took one of their courses! In the course, a group of writers communicated with each other, and gave one another feedback on writing, and at the very end, one of the agents gave one or two sentences of summary feedback to each writer. Finally, I think one writer was selected to pitch their manuscript to the agents. We writers paid a literary agency (handsomely), whose job it is to find publishers for writers and take a fee, so that we could give one another feedback on our writing. 

How did it come to this? Because money flows in this industry not from readers, not to writers, but from writers and to those who give them the false promise of “publication”. 

But it has been decades since the time when a writer, in order to be read, needed a publisher to work on a printing press with ink and paper to be read. It has been decades since the time when those publishers, who wanted to make sure they made profits off of selling those paper-and-ink products, had to be careful gatekeepers, rejecting most manuscripts and assigning editors the work of improving the lucky few that were chosen. 

That isn’t how it works any more, writers. Today you join the other billions with an internet connection and put your words up somewhere – probably in some space owned by one of the tech giants. What, then, is this mystique of “getting published” that writers are being sold? It is nothing other than any other promise of fame and fortune. 

It turns out the less meaningful the service offered (“publication” of words you can put out in any of a hundred places on the web within seconds of logging on?) the more intensely the service is marketed to writers – who should be the sellers, not the buyers. 

Writing isn’t the only thing that has gone this way. Money is made by teaching people how to become yoga teachers, not by teaching yoga. Money is made by teaching people how to become life coaches, not by coaching people how to live their lives. The best though is of course the online courses that teach you how to make money making online courses! Such courses do exist. 

And yet, I have to admit that the most valuable advice I found about how to understand our current publishing landscape came from an author of a how-to book about how to make money creating how-to books. This author, John T. Reed, has self-published a novel called The Unelected President about what happens when “Mike Medlock, a libertarian, non-politician accidentally becomes president of the United States while serving out a dead senator’s term.” I’m the author of the Anti-Empire Project. I don’t see eye to eye politically with John T. Reed, whose novel blurb ends: “ There’s a new sheriff in town, and the North Koreans, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Chinese, and Russians are very unhappy about that.”  I would, no doubt, also be unhappy about Mike Medlock being the new sheriff in town. 

Nevertheless, I have always believed that insights can come from anywhere and anyone and what anti-imperialist doesn’t have at least one uncle with John T. Reed’s politics? At any rate, Reed sold me his How to Write, Publish, and Sell Your Own How-To Book. I sent him the payment. He had the book printed and bound. And his family operation had it shipped to me (at my expense). And my favorite line in the book was (from memory, because I loaned the book to a friend): “There are two kinds of publishing: vanity publishing and self-publishing.”

For as long as there’s been a publishing industry, self-publishing was disparaged as “vanity publishing”, because writers, unable or unwilling to risk rejection by a “real” publisher, did it only to see their book in print. But John T. Reed argues that today it’s those who seek a publisher that are the real “vanity publishers”, since all they want is to see their name on a book as the author. That those who want to make money selling books have to undertake the editing, printing, and distribution tasks themselves. And, John T. Reed warns, don’t use Amazon, which is the worst of both worlds! 

I found John T. Reed’s ideas so compelling that I’ve decided to try them out. More on that later. 

First, let’s finish unraveling the propaganda mechanisms upon which the business model of marketing to writers depends. For them to work, writers must be completely psychologically broken, convinced that we have to beg readers for attention and beg social media companies for access to the chance to beg those readers for attention. So broken that we forget the reason we started writing. So broken we forget how much, and how eagerly, people love to read. 

Capitalist propaganda would never try to sell writers on a pitch like: “learn how to research and write to provide use-value for others and earn a good living in the process!” Instead, it’s the promise of being one of the superstars and, importantly, of not being one of the rejected losers! 

(Probably worth mentioning that it isn’t just propaganda, but legal and monopoly mechanisms that the propaganda serves. Cory Doctorow and Rebecca Giblin call it Chokepoint Capitalism.)

But in fact, the market for writing is a long-tailed one. Sure, there are the superstars. But you don’t need to be one of them to find your readers, even – gasp – readers who are able to pay for your writing. 

No matter how much they try to make you feel otherwise, there are three facts that endure: 1. Readers like to read 2.Despite all the hype about how people don’t read any more, you know people love reading and they do it all day. 3. It’s about you and readers and everything else is people coming in between trying to make some money off of both. The social media giants have made you feel like, in the attention economy, readers are doing you a favor by reading your stuff and above all, these platforming profiteers are doing you a favor by putting your stuff in front of readers. 

Not true. All readers want is to find out something they didn’t know before through a written conversation with another person. They don’t need stars or superstar authors, the precise 28 beats of storytelling to be followed, “plain english” excised of all Latin words, or Joseph Campbell Heroes Journeys for every character. 

Maybe everything becomes a superstar system in our world, including the substack over which I write you today (having left mailchimp because they lowered the size of their free tier mailing list to better focus on their paying customers – which didn’t include me). But let’s have the conversations we can have in the meantime. 

Don’t let them break your spirit, writers! We are all on here to write to each other, and we all love to read. Allow me to qualify my earlier words that only writers and readers matter and nuance it this way: Let use-value be your filter. Editors are here to help. Publishers do valuable work including assigning good editors and artists and making your writing into a nice book. 

[Sidebar: There are exceptions, including big ones. I have loved working with Monthly Review and with Fernwood as a writer – and it’s probably no coincidence that I love reading their books as a reader. Monthly Review and Fernwood are mission-driven publishers that serve their community of readers. You don’t work with them for vanity or for money, but for the mission. And the mission doesn’t have to be as exalted   – in my opinion – as MR or Fernwood’s: academic publishing generally is supposed to be mission-driven too.]

But you don’t need gatekeepers between you and readers and you definitely don’t need gatekeepers who make you feel bad about yourself. Your writing is an offering and I’m grateful for it. So, writers: thank you.

And whether you:

  • make tactical use of a blogging platform like substack or wordpress;

  • follow the advice of John T. Reed laying out, printing, and mailing your own books;

  • or even find a publisher that shares your values and doesn’t treat you like a nuisance;

Stop letting the platform giants (and those who have internalized their propaganda) bully you!

And readers – if you’re interested – do consider buying my books. You see, I’ve started this whole self-publishing thing… and I’ll make a substack post announcing just that in a few days. 

In Real Time with Stan Cox 4: A discussion of violence and policy murder

The fourth discussion with Stan Cox about his latest dispatch, “They’ll Show Up Armed – Countering Policy Murder and the Rising Violence of the Right”. We talk about a nonviolent march Stan participated in and a few of the historic movement debates about violence and nonviolence that we’ve seen over the decades. And we conclude with the question: will it be necessary for there to be more guns out there, to get gun control back on the agenda?

Countering violence with Stan Cox

Newsletter: Reading Galeano in Costa Rica

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Reading Galeano in Costa Rica

I recently had occasion to re-read Eduardo Galeano’s book, the Open Veins of Latin America, and to do it while traveling in Costa Rica.

Open Veins was written in 1970, and remains relevant a half-century later (and it would have been current and relevant to debates half a century before, had it been written in 1920). There are some heart-rending moments, where Galeano talks full of hope about Salvador Allende’s plans in Chile (Allende was overthrown in 1973). But there is also vindication – he talks about how much progress the Cuban Revolution has made in a decade (by 1970) and half a century later, Cuba is sending its doctors to save lives all over the world. In the decades after Galeano’s book, Cuba also helped overthrow South African apartheid, which must have seemed an intractable reality when Galeano wrote Open Veins, and survived the collapse of its ally, the USSR, by inventing agroecology.

I wanted to write this newsletter about an experience that maybe you have had: you read a book, then decades later you re-read it and it is a completely different experience. There is so much on this second read that my eyes glossed over when I first read it without knowledge of the surrounding history. I’m also perpetually amazed by how much people seemed to know in the 1970s – about imperialism, about environmental issues, and even about history – that was since forgotten and is only being picked up again now. Has there been a review of imperialism in the Americas that surpasses Open Veins? Has there been a review of imperialism in Africa that surpasses How Europe Underdeveloped Africa by Walter Rodney? Let me know if you think there is one that I missed.

Let me share with you some of the stories that struck me this time around, in this book that I now think of as one of the best economics textbooks out there.

No accomplices here

In telling the story of Tupac Amaru’s revolt against the Spanish in Peru, Galeano has a dialogue between an Inquisitor who talks to Tupac Amaru after his capture. “The Examiner Areche entered his cell to demand, in exchange for promises, the names of his rebel accomplices. Tupac Amaru replied scornfully: ‘There are no accomplices here otehr than you and I. You as oppressor, I as liberator, deserve to die.’” [Listeners to the Civilizations Series know that I scour history for quotes like these by invincible anti-colonial heroes…]

1703 Methuen Treaty, 1713 Assiento Contract and the rise of England

Galeano talks about the importance of the 1703 Methuen Treaty between Portugal and England, which basically enabled England to take over Portugal’s economy – including all the resources of the Americas (notably Brazilian gold) that Portugal had stolen in the previous two centuries. Portugal and England were the two countries Ricardo built his “Theory of Comparative Advantage” on – the England-serving theory that said that England should specialize in building manufacturing power while Portugal supplied it with wine (even though what Portugal was actually supplying wasn’t wine, but Brazilian gold). Between the Methuen Treaty and the Assiento Treaty with Spain of 1713 which granted England a monopoly over the slave trade to the Americas, we see the basis of England’s rise. The Portuguese prime minister, the Marquis de Pombal, in 1755 said that “the English had conquered Portugal without the trouble of a conquest.”

The commodity doesn’t bring wealth

Story after story in Open Veins is of the discovery of some immense new source of wealth (sugar, gold, silver, nitrates…) which creates a boom, after which the area of the boom is abandoned to squalor. There are two points here. First, commodities don’t make a town or a nation wealthy – they provide wealth to be siphoned to the metropole of the time. And second, that the particular commodity doesn’t seem to matter – the commodities are depleted but the relationship of subordination (and of Open Veins) remains constant. Venezuela was a cacao monopoly before it was an oil monopoly; Chile was the go-to place for guano before copper; Bolivia was about silver before tin and gas…

Slave revolts and the Black Kingdom of Palmares, 1693

There are slave revolts described by Galeano that I wish I’d covered in Civilizations! One in 1522 in Santo Domingo by the slaves of Diego Columbus (the son of *that* Columbus). A huge revolt in Guiana; in Brazil they built a Black Kingdom of Palmares, which “throughout the eighteenth century had successfully resisted dozens of military expeditions sent to suppress them… assaults by thousands of soldiers were fruitless against the guerrilla tactics which, until 1693, made the refuge invulnerable.” The Black Kingdom had positive human *and* positive ecological consequences: “Palmares was the one corner of Brazil where agriculture was being diversified. Guided by their own experience or that of their ancestors… the [Africans] raised corn, sweet potatoes, beans, manioc, bananas, and other foods” where only sugar was growing elsewhere in Brazil. Finally the Portuguese sent the biggest army seen in Brazilian history to invade.

19th Century British-sponsored regime changes

The names Sandino, Zapata, Arbenz, and Cardenas probably ring bells for you but names like Ubico, Artigas, and Balmaceda were less familiar. Jose Artigas of Argentina/Uruguay, a leader from 1811-1820 and contemporary of Simon Bolivar, is one that Galeano feels has been wronged by history “the victim of impassioned vilification by official historians”, “he fought against Spanish and Portuguese, and his forces were finally crushed by a pincer movement from Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires – instruments of the British Empire.” He levied tariffs, enacted land reforms, passed an agrarian code in 1815 – but when he was defeated, his enemies undid most of what he’d made.

There’s also Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina in the 1840s, who Galeano also thinks has been done wrong by history (and his Wikipedia page would certainly indicate as much). De Rosas introduced a tariff banning “iron and tinplate manufactures, riding equipment, ponchos, belts, wool or cotton waistbands, coarse woolen cloth, farm products, carriage wheels, tallow candles and combs, and levied heavy duties on coaches, shoes, cordage, clothing, saddles, dried fruits, and alcoholic beverages.” Industry flourished for about 10 years, until “the guns of British and French warships smashed the chains across the Rio Parana to open up the interior waterways that Rosas had kept firmly closed.” The intervention was asked for by a petition from “1500 bankers, traders, and industrialists” who asked the British government to intervene. De Rosas was limited, Galeano argues, because he “always remained true to his class” and so could never undertake a “dynamic, sustained, industrial policy.”

1886-1890, Chile had a President Jose Manuel Balmaceda, who “undertook the most ambitious development plan in its history.” The program was wide-ranging, from nationalizing industry to modernizing education. The British press called him a “butcher” and a “dictator of the worst stripe”, supporting a rebellion and a civil war in which London “generously financed the rebels” while “British warships blockaded the Chilean coast.” It was Balmaceda-must-go. When he was defeated, the British Ambassador wrote home: “The British community makes no secret of its satisfaction over the fall of Balmaceda, whose victory, it is thought, would have ipmlied serious harm to British commercial interests.”

But the most shocking story for me was that there was basically a genocide against Paraguay, sponsored by the British and conducted by Paraguay’s neighbours, in 1870. Somehow, Galeano argues, Paraguay had escaped imperialist absorption until then “the only country that foreign capital had not deformed”. Early 19th century dictators maintained a developmentalist outlook: “When the invaders appeared on the horizon in 1865, Paraguay had telegraphs, a railroad, and numerous factories manufacturing construction materials, textiles, linens, ponchos, paper and ink, crockery and gunpowder.” There was a military industry, a steel industry, a merchant fleet, a stable currency and a balance of payments surplus. “It did not owe one penny abroad, yet was able to maintain the best army in South America.” So, British commerce decided it had to be destroyed. Edward Thornton, the British minister in Buenos Aires, was a key plotter – it was an invasion by a Triple Alliance of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Paraguay’s president Solano Lopez was presented as “the Attila of America”, etc. The war lasted five years. “Men and women, young and old, fought like lions… when bullets and spears finally finished off the Paraguayan president… he managed to say, ‘I die with my country’ – and it was true. Paraguay died with him.” When the war began, Galeano says, Paraguay’s population was around the same as Argentina’s. By the end, it was 250,000. It destroyed the invaders as well as the invaded. “The financial bankruptcy of the three countries deepened their dependency on Britain. The Paraguay massacre left its mark on them forever.” So an early, unsung, British-sponsored, genocidal regime change in the Americas around the same time as the crushing of the Morant Bay Uprising in Jamaica.

Concluding notes: protectionism, and culture

Galeano’s analysis of US protectionism is also of interest. He argues that the rise of the US occurred precisely because the US didn’t make Britain rich the way the Caribbean made Britain rich and the way Latin America made Britain rich. He calls it “the importance of not being important”, which combined with racial indulgence towards its settler colonies to give them space to grow to industrial power. Ulysses Grant is quoted: “For centuries England has relied on protection, has carried it to extremes, and has obtained satisfactory results from it. After two centuries, England has found it convenient to adopt free trade… Very well then… within two hundred years, when America has gotten out of protection all that it can offer, it too will adopt free trade.” It’s pithy but it isn’t quite right either – since England never abandoned protectionism where it matters and neither has the US. Free trade isn’t a phase: it’s always for others, never for the metropole.

There’s so much more in this book that I’ve only written up half my notes here. But I’ll leave you with this quote which has been on my mind ever since, about the importance of culture and of education.

“Latin American universities turn out mathematicians, engineers, and programmers who can only find work in exile: we give ourselves the luxury of providing the US with our best technicians and ablest scientists, who are urged to emigrate by the high salaries and broad research possibilities available in the north. At the same time, whenever a Latin American university or center of higher learning tries to stimulate the basic sciences, to lay the foundations for a technology that is not copied from foreign patterns and interests, a timely coup d’etat destroys the experiment on the pretext that it is an incubator of subversion. The University of Brasilia, crushed in 1964, was an example of this. And the truth is that the armor-plated archangels who guard the established order are not mistaken: an autonomous cultural policy, when it is genuine, requires and promotes deep changes in all existing structures.

If you’ve read (or re-read) this book lately, what jumped out for you?

-Justin

An interview on Balochistan

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The war in Balochistan has gone on too long

Friends, welcome back for the March newsletter. Early this month I wrote an article for Globetrotter trying to imagine a development-first path to peace in Balochistan. The article was based on three interesting interviews – with Andrew Korybko, Shah Jahan Baloch, and Pervez Hoodbhoy. What was remarkable about the interview with Pervez was that I sent him a series of questions over email, and he replied with basically a highly polished Q/A. I quoted from it for the article but in my opinion it was too good to not put on the web somewhere. So, I’m sending it to you as a reward for being on this list. If not all of you know Hoodbhoy’s work, now would be a good time to find it – he’s required and prolific reading, on things Pakistan and well beyond. A good place to start would be the Eqbal Ahmad Centre for Public Education.

And now the interview. Have a good April and I’ll be back with something at the end of that month.

Justin Podur (JP): How would you characterize the demands of Balochistan’s movements at the moment? After many conflicts over the decades (four rounds, I believe based on my background reading), are there different tendencies with different demands, some for autonomy, a greater share of resources, and some for outright separatism?

Pervez Hoodbhoy (PH): In political terms, Balochistan has been in revolt since the birth of Pakistan in 1947. It remains so today as well. The nationalists speak of Punjabi occupation, the revival of Baloch independence (referring to the Kalat State) and the reunification of the historical Baloch territory now spread between three states and among numerous provinces within them. The 1973-1976 war was Marxist-led and followed a long train of abuses by the center, including the undue extraction of Balochistan’s mineral wealth. Bhutto’s order to uproot that insurgency in 1973 was a godsend for an army despondent after its surrender to Indian forces in 1971. The final cost of suppressing this insurgency stood at 3000-3500 soldiers, over 5000 Baloch fighters, and many thousand civilians.

JP: How are Baloch movements treated by the state? Is there some dialogue, some attempts to improve representation, along with the repression and human rights violations that we hear about?

PH: The army establishment uses all kinds of ploys but there’s no real softening. It sees Baloch nationalism as a threat to its hegemony and does all it can to crush it. This has become particularly important after the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which the Baloch resent. Like the dreaded generals of Latin America, Pakistan’s generals too have learned how to quell insurgencies. Over the years dead bodies have appeared on the roadsides with marks of torture and many thousand young Baloch men have gone missing, some forever. The Supreme Court of Pakistan expressed helplessness in face of numerous petitions. The establishment has willfully used extremist militant religious organizations like Sipah-e-Sahaba as an antidote to Baloch nationalism. It has worked up to a point – what was once a Marxist inspired insurgency as in the 1973 uprising – is now more ethnically oriented.

JP: Is there any joint struggle between Balochistan’s movements and other activists in Pakistan? Anything at the level of official politics? How is the situation in Balochistan seen in the rest of Pakistan?

PH: For much of Pakistan, Balochistan is far off distant land about which is little is known. The mainstream media may not comment upon Baloch matters. No journalist who reports accurately on events from Balochistan can expect to live too long. Balochistan is such a sensitive issue for the ruling establishment that Pakistan’s universities may not hold seminars or meetings and Baloch students in Punjab and Sind are closely watched by the so-called “agencies”. In January 2022, Baloch students were rounded up in Lahore, which is many hundred miles away, after a terrorist attack likely carried out by the Taliban.

JP: Is the Pakistani establishment feeling more confident now that the US has left Afghanistan? Does this have any impact on the Balochistan situation?

PH: In principle it should be but it is not. The US exit from Afghanistan and the rule of the Taliban has not lessened the anxiety of Pakistan’s Punjab-centered civil and military establishment. It is bent upon resource extraction and upon making Balochistan safe for the Chinese. It wasn’t ever that the generals feared the US. Rather it was India’s tit-for-tat in Balochistan that they were afraid of. Everyone knows that for decades Pakistan had helped fuel the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir and now it was getting paid back in the same coin.

JP: It seems to me that US and Pakistan relations are at a low point, including the financial sanctions of FATF and other impacts. Does this have any impact on the Balochistan situation – in terms of US covert operations in Balochistan (and/or Afghanistan pre- and post-2021…)

PH: Pakistan’s generals are rather miffed that, now that their boys have won in Afghanistan, the US does not seem to care much about them – or for Pakistan – any more. After all they had made a killing for decades from the Coalition Support Funds driven by NATO’s need to truck supplies into land-locked Afghanistan. The loss of geopolitical importance after last August means that the gravy train has stopped. China has not taken up the slack – it has put in $62 billion into Pakistan but these are all loans and investments, almost no aid. Our generals would like to give the US bases for use in Afghanistan on the sly, but the US has pretty much burnt its boats there – it does not seem to have any large scale military ambitions in Afghanistan presently. Instead it would rather ally with India against China; allying with both India and Pakistan is very difficult.

JP: Is Balochistan one area where Pakistan’s relationship to India isn’t really relevant? Or is it still relevant?

PH: Well, on every occasion when the security forces or Chinese nationals have been attacked in Balochistan, the Pakistani establishment has blamed India. The capture of Kulbhushan Yadhav in 2017, an Indian national with a faked passport, was held as one solid proof of Indian involvement in seeking to subvert CPEC. Could this allegation be correct? Possibly so. As a general rule, whenever a population is angry with those who it sees as an occupying power, it is not hard for enemies of that power to find domestic allies. This is exactly why Pakistan was able to successfully recruit Kashmiris on the Indian side of the LOC. And this is also why Balochistan is now an arrow in India’s quiver against Pakistan.

JP: Another question is how Pakistan seems to have lost influence in Kashmir, and whether that is a temporary situation or not.

PH: India has so thoroughly fenced off the Line of Control in Kashmir that Pakistan based jihadis are finding it near impossible to breach it. But even more, the jihad infrastructure has had to down-sized because international monetary sanctions, in particular FATF (Financial Action Task Force), has arm twisted Pakistan into dropping support for cross-border activities. However, India has not been able to translate Pakistan’s loss into its gain. The Hindu nationalism of India’s ruling party is unacceptable to the majority of Muslims in the Kashmir valley. So there is a lull, but neither India nor Pakistan seem to learn from history.

JP: Why has Islamabad gone to such extreme lengths to protect China’s interests in Balochistan? Why are Baloch insurgents targeting Chinese projects?

PH: Islamabad’s czars have made sure that the Balochistan assembly and various chief ministers have almost no say in matters related to the $62 billion dollar China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project of which Gwadar is the linchpin. The port of Gwadar, which was historically a fishing village, is China’s future base in the Persian Gulf. China is therefore viewed as an accomplice of Islamabad and Chinese businessmen, engineers, and technicians are seen as fair game for assassination and kidnapping. The 2018 attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, and on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar in 2019, were claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army and sent shockwaves down the CPEC corridor.

In December 2021, protests in Gwadar became so visible and loud that it became impossible for the establishment to hide or suppress the fact. These drew tens of thousands of people, including women and children, day after day for three weeks from nearby areas of Gwadar including Turbat, Pishkan, Zamran, Buleda, Ormara and Pasni. They were protesting against the treatment of locals, and particularly the paucity of drinking water and intrusions by Chinese fishing vessels. The sense of deprivation is felt far and wide in Balochistan. Baloch nationalists feel they have always been sold out by the center. For example in 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who met with Nixon twice in the White House, had offered Gwadar to the US with the view that it could use it as a naval base. The US, however, rejected the proposal because the US already had ships in Chabahar under the Shah of Iran’s pro-American government!

JP: What possibilities and prospects exist for improving the situation?

PH: The diversity of its various peoples means that ethno-nationalism will always to be a challenge to the center. But this, by itself, is not a bad thing. India with far greater diversity could nevertheless succeed in evolving a stable political dispensation. The devastation of Pakistan in 1971 showed decisively the hollowness of its belief that religion can suffice to cement disparate peoples together. Nor will raw force work forever. The key to Pakistan’s stability does not lie in making the Army’s fist yet harder or peddling hard varieties of religion in an attempt to contain nationalist discontent. Instead it must be found in sharply limiting the power of the federation, sharing power between provinces, equitably distributing resources, and giving Pakistan’s various cultures and languages their due. In the long run, only a system where all have a stake can survive and prosper.

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a an Islamabad based physicist and social activist

AEP February newsletter: Peace is the priority

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Dear friends,

I don’t have a February article to share (my China-Africa article came out in FAIR on Jan 31) but I have had inquiries about what someone who runs a site called the “Anti-Empire Project” has to say about the war in Ukraine.

I have been tweeting about it and today what I mainly had to say was expressing hope that the negotiations yield something. I’ve been told they’ve already broken off and amounted to nothing, but I can’t verify that and anyway that’s how negotiations go – they yield nothing until they yield something.

You can look back at the archives on my site and see that Russia and Ukraine aren’t areas that I cover extensively – though of course as an antiwar activist you’ll find a few items on it – like this interview from 2017 with academic Halyna Mokrushyna from the early days of the podcast (can’t say much about the audio quality, but Halyna was insightful if you’re looking for background). But it’s impossible to not pay attention to this so instead of claiming any instant expertise that I do not have, let me say a few things about my approach to these situations and then a few things that I’m reading.

Sources: You will have figured out that there is an “information war” happening as part of the actual war. When you see a claim about something that happened in the war, you have to apply the usual tests – what are the interests of the source? Does the information fit the source’s biases or run against them? What is the source’s past record – what were they working on and doing before this current conflict started? Not just what kinds of things, but how accurate were they? Do they have good academic practice (do they reveal their sources and research methods so that you can follow their trail)? Start with the CRAAP method (Currency, Relevance, Accuracy, Authority, Purpose) and go from there. Know that during wars there is 10x more disinformation than usual and there’s a lot in normal times.

Analysis: At the risk of having some of you new subscribers flee, you should know that my point of view is that there is only one empire in the world today. That’s why this site isn’t called the “Anti-EmpireS Project”. There are many relationships between states and there are big states that exert disproportionate influence on their smaller neighbours. But when you hear me talking about “the Empire”, I’m referring to a whole background of the events of the past 250 years or so, when first the British Empire and now the American Empire ruled (and a pretty smooth transition between these two). If you’re skeptical about this, I doubt I’ll be able to convince you in one paragraph of a newsletter but I am planning to do at least a podcast episode on this topic some time soon. The point here though is that I do understand the context of this to be NATO expansion and the US desire to prevent any rivals from presenting any challenge to its influence, and to try to ensure that the only power that can set red lines is the US.

The only other point of analysis that I’d suggest is that you reject any personal, psychological or pseudo-psychological, explanations of the situation (e.g. “Putin is a madman”). These are a substitute for hard thinking and information, and get you away from thinking about political and economic issues that are key to understanding the problem and its solution. The same goes for demonization, and though you know I am no fan of “both sides” type analysis, this is a case where demonization should be strictly avoided, on “both sides”. Nazi-type parties polled around 2% in the 2019 Ukraine election, despite their high visibility. Ukraine and Russia are neighbours and will have to live as neighbours when this is over. It would be unhelpful to that future to do demonizing if you lived there. To do demonizing from elsewhere is reprehensible.

Peace is the priority: If this is an anti-empire project, one premise is that war has a pro-empire bias and peace has an anti-empire bias. I know that you could read the whole history of wars of national liberation otherwise – but even wars of national liberation end with peace agreements and it’s my belief that the faster and less destructive the path to a peace agreement, the better. Another related point is that, as many have said, peace deals are made between enemies, not friends – the right people to talk are the people who are fighting and the right time for a peace agreement is yesterday if possible, but right now will do.

Alright. Some readings:

-Michael Hudson, America Defeats Germany for the Third Time – the author of Superimperialism explains some of the economics.

-Ivan Timofeev, Ukraine: Three Scenarios – a Russian writer outlines three scenarios a month ago, and we are in scenario 1.

-MA Bhadrakumar – an Indian ex-diplomat runs a well-informed blog, Indian Punchline, on world events with lots of information on Ukraine-Russia right now.

-I’d also recommend watching the US-based, well-connected John Meirsheimer’s lecture from 2015, “Why is Ukraine the West’s Fault?” and his updated talk from last week, given to a university audience in London over Zoom.

There is more, but I’ll leave it there. I’d be happy to hear from you what you’re reading and thinking about this, and whatever you think could help nudge the situation towards a peaceful resolution.

-Justin

Transcript: Talking to Vijay Prashad about “Modernization”

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Let’s debate “modernization”

Dear Anti-Empire friends,

I’ve decided that I’m going to send you something on the 30th of every month. Instead of just sending articles as they come out, I am going to try for 2022 to send something – an article, a quick review, or in this case, a transcript, once a month, on the 30th.

For the first Anti-Empire 30th of 2022, here is a conversation I had on the now renamed Anti-Empire Radio (to distinguish it from the Civilizations Series historical podcasts) on January 13, 2022. I invited Vijay Prashad to join me after some twitter controversy about the word “modernization”. I hoped to settle the question in the conversation. The transcript is a bonus for you all (newsletter subscribers).

Hope you are doing well and following the Scramble for Africa series, which I have learned a hell of a lot researching and which we’re about half way through. Watch for the latest, the Zionists and the Scramble for Africa, which should be coming out any day now.

Now the transcript of Anti-Empire Radio Episode 101.

Interviewing Vijay Prashad about the question of “What Should the Left do About China?”

Transcript of the Anti-Empire Project’s Anti-Empire Radio Episode 101, recorded January 13, 2022.

Justin Podur: Well, Vijay Prashad, welcome. Here we are.

Vijay Prashad: Thanks. Great to be with you, Justin.

Justin Podur: For the listeners who don’t know, Vijay is the director of the Tri Continental Institute for Social Research, author of many, many books. The most recent would be Washington Bullets, which had a blurb from Evo Morales, which I know Vijay is proud of because you see the blurb everywhere.

For no particular reason, I just wanted to talk to you today on January 13th. I just thought I’d invite you out of the blue and, just for a chat, but I wanted to talk to you specifically about an idea that I’ve been having – just spontaneously – about modernization. What do you think of the idea? Because I think the idea of modernization — there’s a critique, I think, a very legitimate critique Indigenous movements. The indigenous movements that say, we don’t want your stupid modernization, we don’t want you to stick your your mines and your poisoned water and your dams all over our territory and call that modernization. We don’t want you to assimilate our children and impose, the English language or French language, your colonial languages on us. We don’t want that kind of modernization. On the other hand, you have China or Cuba, when they when they have like a universal literacy program or China’s attempt to lift — successful attempt to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. They would use the term modernization for building infrastructure and building out education. So how do you think about this idea of modernization in different contexts?

Vijay Prashad: Well, it’s a tough discussion to enter into because the terms are easily misconstrued. I know there’s a critique to be made of what is known as modernization theory. Rostow and other American political scientists after World War Two in the height of the Cold War made the argument against communism, saying that societies need to be moved from tradition to modernity. That’s modernization theory. there are roots in the sociology of Talcott Parsons. There are roots in in in various forms of positivist sociology. Going back to 19th century Germany, where where the idea was, you move from Gemeinschaft or community to Gesellschaft, which is civil society and the journey between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, tradition to modernity is something that has to happen to bring us into this contemporary world, which is alienating and as its own isolation and problems and so on. There’s a tradition in European social thought. There’s a tradition in political thinking in general about this great transition.

Justin Podur: And how about how about in communist theory? Do communists adopt that stage theory of like barbarism, or whatever, tribalism and then states and then advanced civilizations? Is that a debate? How would you define the debate within the communist literature?

Vijay Prashad: It actually doesn’t map onto this at all, because you see, this theory suggests that somehow modernity which becomes coterminous to capitalism is the big break from an older history, from the past. But in fact, many of the people who make the claim for modernity do it in a very constrained way. its modernity generally for Europeans where they are able to transcend their culture because that’s part of of the idea is that you have to be able to break out of your community, you have to become an individual as it were. And that has to do with capitalism, with market relations, with the way you enter the market, as an individual with your merit and so on. This is there very much in Max Weber and others. That’s one whole tradition of thinking.

But at the same time, they say that the so-called quote unquote barbarians, those who had been colonized, they don’t have the cultural wherewithal to break from their tradition and become modern. And there are many accounts in the 1950s of anthropologists and sociologists who travel to India, travel to Nigeria. They write books about the blockage of modernity because these cultures are an impediment. Now that’s interesting because in fact, they’re reproducing colonial thought. In the colonial times colonial leaders would come to these parts of the world – Asia, Africa, Latin America, into Eastern Europe even. And they would say things like, “Look, these people cannot be made into modern. The most we can do is we can sort of train them to live in the modern world. They can’t become modern, but they can live in the modern world. We’ll extract resources.”

Justin Podur: As it happens, they can live as our slaves more or less.

Vijay Prashad: Yeah, exactly. they have a different standard of living. In 1984, when the Union Carbide factory exploded in Bhopal, in India, an American executive said, “Look, Indians have a different idea of life. their their notion of human life is different. Three thousand Indians dying in an explosion, well, they think they’ll be born again and so on. We don’t need to worry about it so much.” But if one American dies, that’s horrendous. And by the way, this calculation is seen in wars that the United States conducts. If a US soldier is killed, that’s an abomination. If five hundred civilians are killed, well, we’re sorry you died, but you have a different attitude to life. So that colonial thinking is very much there. Modernization theory in this theory that capitalism can come to these parts of the world. But let’s face it, they don’t need to be paid too much in India. those workers, they can live in wretched conditions and caste hierarchies can be reproduced to help maintain capitalist structures. We’ll have these oppressed castes do that occupation and so on. This was mapped onto Indian reality. I’m giving you the Indian example because I know that best of all.

In the communist tradition, the idea was you have to break radically from the social hierarchies of the past. It’s not that you go from community to individualism, you go from social hierarchy to social equality. You don’t go to individualism, you go to a social world where people don’t are not tormented by the wretched hierarchies of the past. Hierarchies reinforced by religion, by race, by caste, by patriarchy and so on. So the communist transition period goes from social hierarchy, the wretchedness of those hierarchies to social equality. So actually, it’s quite different.

Now the thing is that maybe we suffer from a problem of language. What do we call that communist transition from social hierarchy to social equality? Well, we call it to some extent modernization. Why should we allow the capitalist groups to basically take over and monopolize the concept of modernity? We say it’s a form of modernization, socialist modernization. Why? Because part of the modernization is improving the basic conditions of people’s lives. You’ve got to improve things like literacy levels. You’ve got to improve things like access to running water so that because of the nature of patriarchy, women spend hours going to collect water. Their leisure time is reduced, their capacity to study is reduced. The capacity to engage other people is reduced. So all of that is part of socialist modernization and —

Justin Podur: — Literacy, right? In a lot of communist revolutions, there is a program to make sure that girls and women learn to read at the same rates as men, and there’s often a lot of resistance to that in rural areas. We’ve been talking about Afghanistan for a while and that that whole thing that came up, Anand Gopal wrote this article called the other Afghan Women (https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/09/13/the-other-afghan-women), where he was talking about why women accepted the Taliban over the American constant bombing and and destruction of their villages. And they thought at least the Taliban could put an end to this. But he goes back to the 70s in this village and and in the village, he says, the communists sent these teachers and then the people slit all the teachers throats and then the communists got mad and arrested them all. And they were never seen again.

[Transcriber’s note: the exact quote in Gopal’s article is: “When the authorities began forcing girls to attend classes at gunpoint, a rebellion erupted, led by armed men calling themselves the mujahideen. In their first operation, they kidnapped all the schoolteachers in the valley, many of whom supported girls’ education, and slit their throats. The next day, the government arrested tribal elders and landlords on the suspicion that they were bankrolling the mujahideen. These community leaders were never seen again.”]

And it’s like: There was repression, but it wasn’t repression because we were trying to force you to send your kids to school. It was repression because you murdered the teachers. What’s the punishment for murder in any country?

Vijay Prashad: Well, also, that story is not it’s not accurate how it’s told. I spend a lot of time talking to Anahita Ratezbad who ran some of those literacy programs in Afghanistan. After the Saur Revolution in April 1978, one of the key features of the new revolutionary government was “we’ve got to educate the public.” Education levels were abysmally low, both for men and women. So fifteen thousand communists and sympathizers and teachers went out into rural areas extremely bravely because they had to confront the landlords. They had to confront conservative men, to confront conservative religious leaders, and eventually they had to confront the mujahideen funded by the Pakistanis, the Saudis and the United States who came across the border from Pakistan and attacked them. These were very brave people. Fifteen thousand of them and thousands of them either lost their lives or were kidnapped and never seen again. many were kidnapped and God knows what happened to them. Were they taken to Pakistan where they were forced to do whatever. I don’t know. We don’t know. These are brave people. What were they doing wrong? they were out there trying to bring literacy and education in the countryside, and they were confronted, not by the people. That’s why I said that the story is wrong. They were not confronted by the people. They were confronted by landlords, by religious clerics, by conservative figures who said, “We don’t want education for our serfs.”

Because let’s face it, in rural Afghanistan, in the nineteen sixties and seventies, land relations were appalling, and most of the landless workers had to work as serfs. They were indebted, born slaves and so on. And when the communists and the teachers and others came to the countryside to conduct literacy classes amongst the bond slaves and so on, landlords didn’t want that. This was a great threat to them, to what they saw as their property. So which side are you going to stand on there? Are you going to stand with the landlords and with the mullahs? With the conservatives or with these people who want education? I’m not saying stand with the teachers. I’m saying stand with the people who want education, the born slaves and so on. That’s why I I reject the characterization that “the people rejected the teachers.” Not true. There’s a class struggle in the countryside and the teachers came on the side of one class against another and they were killed because they did that. Now is this modernization to my mind? Yes, but it’s also the advance of society. Are you against that?

Justin Podur: I want to add two more examples. One is from Fanshen, which is this documentary of the Chinese revolution in a village. It’s a book. It’s a big book by William Hinton, and I gathered later that William Hinton’s daughter lived in China and speaks fluent Chinese and participated in the government — anyway, Hinton wrote this thing. It’s the way people pressed for land reform during the Chinese revolution, and he talks quite a bit about the conditions before the revolution, where as a peasant, you have to go to the bathroom on the the landlord’s toilet because he is not just entitled to your labor and your time, but he’s also entitled to your bowel movements because that becomes night soil, which is his right. If you’re working for him, that’s his right.

So landlords hate land reform. What do you call that? Do you call that changes in that condition modernization? That’s one.

Another example I wanted to add was the U.S. after the Civil War, the Reconstruction. That was when public education arrived in the U.S., especially in the South. But most of the public education in the U.S. starts after slavery is abolished after the Civil War, and again, people were dragged kicking and screaming to education because the elite, the southern elite and the racist elites despised it. And it was Black people who wanted education and demanded education.

And last, I just wanted to make an utter contrast – and I think you will agree – with what Canada does and did with Indigenous children. That has nothing to do with modernization. It has nothing to do with education. They were kidnapping these children and taking them to these places where they died in huge numbers and burying them in unmarked graves. And they were they were doing that with some kind of religious justification. But ultimately they said, we are doing this to “kill the Indian in the child.” We are doing this to get “a final solution to the Indian problem.” That’s fascism. That’s the opposite of socialist or communist modernity, like the opposite in the sense that like these people are fighting to the death all over the world, these two projects.

Vijay Prashad: I’m really glad you brought up Bill Hinton’s Fanshen. I recommend to people another book, Ten Mile Inn In by Isabel Crook and David Crook. In fact, I met Isabel in Beijing just a few years ago. There were a group of Americans like William Hinton and others. Many of them studied at the Putney School in Vermont as children. And they went to China. They were all socialists in one way or the other. Many of them worked in Chinese media. So did Isabel Crook. But Ten Mile Inn is as good a book as Fanshen. I met William Hinton toward the end of his life.

All of them were struck by the way in which the Chinese revolution, the people involved in the Chinese revolution, were angry with the cultural practices of the past, from foot binding to deference to landlords. You know when when the Chinese revolution succeeds and Mao is there at Tiananmen Square, the phrase he uses is captivating. He says China has stood up. the idea of standing up is important. When Thomas Sankara takes power in Upper Volta in a coup d’etat in 1983, one of the first things Sankara does is it changes the name of the country. He says Upper Volta, it’s a colonial name. We don’t live north of the Volta River. We are the land of upright people. Burkina Faso, the land of upright people.

And then Mao says, China stands up. It stood up because the idea of being hunched in front of a landlord, of compulsory hunching. When a landlord comes by, you have to bow down. You have to bow your head, your eyes have to be averted.

Your family is from Kerala. There were hideous cultural practices that the landlords and Brahmins enforced. People had to look down. Their shadow couldn’t touch a Brahmin. They couldn’t open an umbrella on the road. They couldn’t walk on the main road. That to walk on side roads. Women couldn’t wear a top. They had to have their breasts exposed and so on. This wretched kind of culture that we inherited.

In 10 Mile Inn, Isabel and David Crook, right, with great feeling of the anger of the peasantry as they come into some authority and they say, we’re not going to tolerate this anymore. We are going to transform our culture. Now, what do you call this? You call this the advance of a society. This is a people saying we are going to reject it and it’s a class struggle. It’s about a certain class that has been suffocated, saying, we want to breathe. That’s why I like that phrase a lot, land of upright people in Sankara’s thing, or Mao’s thing, stand up straight.

Justin Podur: I think that’s a great thing because historically speaking, because he didn’t just say, Chinese people have stood up. He said China has stood up and he’s referring to stood up after the so-called century of humiliation, the long century of humiliation that starts with the Opium War, opium wars, the destruction of the Summer Palace, basically sponsoring both sides of the of the Taiping Rebellion, the famines that they imposed.

Late Victorian Holocausts by Mike Davis has a little bit of this. We’re talking about tens of millions of Chinese people who died, just like Indian people who died from these famines at around the same time during this century, wars and destruction. And that is actually when Hong Kong became a colony of Britain.

What happened in Hong Kong a couple of years ago because of the security law that China was imposing, which is like pretty much the same type of law that many countries in the world have. The repression that went on when China was repressing the movement against that law, which again was far less than you’d see in the U.S. during the George Floyd rebellion. Or, normal (police) violence in the U.S., not even during an uprising.

With Hong Kong, there’s there’s a little bit too much colonial nostalgia for how great things were under the British that I see when people are talking about Hong Kong. I don’t know if you detect that kind of vibe.

Vijay Prashad: Well, the first thing I want to say because you’ve raised it in this way, Justin, is that in India, when India wins its independence and the partition takes place in India, is then created as a republic in in 1947. In 1950 we have a constitution and become a republic. Eleven years later, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tells the Indian military to get ready. They line up in western India and they march into three parts of India to militarily seize them back into Indian territory. And that’s the areas of Goa, Daman and Diu, which were Portuguese colonies. So the Indian government in 1961 walks into Goa and liberates Goa from Portuguese rule.

Justin Podur: Were there tanks?

Vijay Prashad: There might have been tanks. This is in 1961. This is two years after the People’s Liberation Army for the second time enter into the province of Tibet. The first time was in 1959. the Potala Palace is is now under civilian rule, no longer under the rule of the Lamas in 1959. But in India, this happens in 1961 and by the way, nobody talks about it. It’s interesting. The Chinese government in 1961, 62, 63 did not walk into Hong Kong. They waited till 1997 when effectively the lease ran out. I mean, the Chinese government actually followed the terms of the lease that had been there with the British government. They followed the terms of the lease.

The last governor general of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, who by the way, oversaw the colony without any democratic rights, is now a regular guest on the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, a regular guest complaining about the lack of democracy in Hong Kong. BBC is one of the lead journalistic houses, just as it reported appallingly on Zimbabwe. Lots of colonial nostalgia for what was previously Rhodesia. Lots of nostalgia in the same room.

Justin Podur: Who’s that named after, Rhodesia?

Vijay Prashad: Exactly. Who is that named after? There’s a question. Even the Wikipedia entry is not bad. Go check out who is Rhodesia named after. Well, in Hong Kong 1997, that’s when the so-called lease expires in Hong Kong comes back to territorial control of the Chinese government, which it had been before the lease.

Justin Podur: The lease was one of the unequal treaties. Again, something to look up for listeners look up the unequal treaties.

Vijay Prashad: But they still honored it.. The Indian government didn’t honor anything, just walked into Goa and took it back. And the people of Goa, there were people who were upset and moved to Portugal. So it’s not the case that in Goa people were all thrilled. It’s also the case when the lease expired in 1997, there were lots of people in Hong Kong who didn’t want to leave Britain. They wanted to be part of Britain. That happens in all colonies. When the colonial situation takes place, people collaborate with the colonial leaders, then they want to go with them. That happens all the time.

Justin Podur: It’s also the colonial education system, honestly, a system that’s designed not for modernisation, but to prepare people to be what the colony, what the colonizer needs them to be.

Vijay Prashad: I don’t disparage the people that say, OK, I’m going off to England now. You go, that’s fine. The issue is Britain wants to maintain Hong Kong as a permanent colony. That’s the real issue. One good thing you can say is that when the Portuguese dictatorship was confronted with the Indian takeover of Goa, they couldn’t react. They might have tried, but they couldn’t because a big country like India decided to come in. It’s so interesting. On the African continent on the other hand, at the same time, the Portuguese were brutal in Guinea-Bissau. when Amilcar Cabral and his comrades first began, they began as a nonviolent movement. They experienced massacres in Mozambique. This is all in the nineteen sixties, just after India walked into Goa. No European or US power came out there and put pressure on Lisbon not to behave like that. And the government, the Portuguese government treated Angola, Mozambique, they treated the people there as simply less than human. They animalized labour and I’m being very deliberate in my use of words, they did not treat people as human beings. And there was no criticism of the Portuguese colonial experience, which only ended because the people of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau threw them out in 1974.

Justin Podur: Yeah. Nineteen seventy four. Angola was a colony until nineteen seventy four.

Vijay Prashad: And it’s because the people of Africa overthrew the colonial yoke in these countries that the people in Portugal overthrew their dictatorship. troops who went to fight in Angola, fight in Mozambique came back totally desolate, and they were part of the struggle to overthrow the Salazar dictatorship.

Justin Podur: So would you say, then, that Africa helped Portugal to modernize?

Vijay Prashad: I would say that it was the African national liberation movements that brought democracy to Portugal and the Portuguese should every day get on their knees and rather than thank Salazar and the dictatorship or even the first democratic government that came, they should thank the people of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and so on for in fact, giving Portugal democracy. They would never have had democracy, so easily as they did because of the struggles in this part of the world.

Justin Podur: A couple of other things I’d like to talk about. One is, you use the term, the hybrid war, the U.S. hybrid war on China. A hybrid war is not what you would think of the U.S. having done in Iraq. Like, they’re not just going to invade, but there’s proxies, there’s information war, there’s financial war. There’s lawfare, right? I covered a year of the kidnapping of the Chinese executive Meng Wanzhou from Huawei in Canada.

But Xinjiang, which borders Afghanistan. This northwestern part of China. The ethnicity is Uyghur, and they have a culture, it’s Muslim. Most of the Uyghur people are Muslim. There was a fairly strong separatist movement, a violent separatist movement. A lot of veterans of Syria, the attempt to overthrow Syria, there are still a lot of Uyghur, I militants in Syria now, but a lot of them coming back. They were and people who fought in Afghanistan as well veterans, of the Afghan so-called jihad in the eighties, coming back to Xinjiang and trying to establish kind of independent so-called East Turkestan on that model on like a Saudi model, with those kinds of practices and principles.

There’s a guy on Twitter that I follow, Maitreya Bhakal, and he says, compare the different approaches to a terrorist attack. Because there were fairly big and fairly brutal attacks by this East Turkestan Movement and the Chinese responded with this whole program where they arrested people and they put them in these re-education camps. It’s like that Maoist policy of like you, you sit people down and you criticize them and so on, like there’s a whole history of this in Chinese history. But his point was, maybe that re-education is bad. Not saying it’s good. But compare that policy to the U.S. policy, and it is clearly the least the lesser evil. Like if the U.S. is attacked by terrorists, they go and bomb the country, they bomb children, they bomb women, they bomb indiscriminately. They use cluster bombs, they leave bombs that are going to be there for generations. They destroyed Afghanistan. They occupied it for 20 years. They killed a million people in Iraq, supposedly all to fight terrorism. China has these re-education camps in Xinjiang where people learn job skills and and Mandarin language, and there’s a lot of monitoring, there’s a lot of surveillance. They watch what people do on the internet, the way, the FBI, other people watch what you do on the internet. If you watch too many jihadi videos, you will get a visit from the Secret Service in Canada or in the U.S.

So the thing in Xinjiang is I think it’s fair to say there’s a state, there’s repression, there’s things that they’ve done as a result of trying to repress this campaign of separatism and and some of these organized attacks.

My problem here is the the people in the the U.S. that have the take on it where we should boycott things that are produced there. We should boycott investment. And the ultimate goal of that is the U.S. strategy of creating economic hardship, unemployment and basically using trying to create a pool of resentful people with no opportunities that may then join this kind of separatist movement. So that’s also part of a hybrid war. That’s also part of the U.S. strategy ultimately to break up the countries that rival them, that’s their long term idea.

Vijay Prashad: Let’s go back a little bit. There were some serious problems in Xinjiang and in other provinces in China where there were large numbers of minority peoples. In 1978, when China had a reform era open up under Deng Xiaoping, there was an understanding that China had to grow the economy. It had to increase productivity. It had to increase its scientific and technological know-how and so on because there was impending stagnation. Because after a point, you can’t keep redistributing whatever surplus you have, you have to produce a surplus. That was in 1978. By the early to mid 1990s there was a recognition that a lot of disparities had crept in. One of the great disparities was the disparity in areas far from the Pacific coastal region. Not only Xinjiang, but Kunming and other provinces were not getting the kind of benefits that the Pacific provinces were getting. That was one problem. Secondly, there seemed to be an increase in poverty among minority peoples. That was an issue on the table and had been, to be fair, an issue on the table in the 1950s, when the Dalai Lama was the chairperson of the National Minorities Commission in Beijing. They had already discussed disparities of minorities and so on, but there was really no agenda to pick that up. This was not taken that seriously, in fact, until the early 2000s when, again, this came on the table. There was a suggestion. We’ve got to look west, we’ve got to develop western provinces and so on.

At that time, there were grievances in Xinjiang. No question about it. There were lots of grievances. And it turned out, unfortunately, that because of the war in Afghanistan, because of the really quite horrendous groups that had developed in Central Asia, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a brutal group, many of these young, disgruntled, people from Xinjiang went off to Central Asia and then they went into the kind of jihad international, cutting their teeth in Libya. I mean, I met many of these people in Syria. Now the headquarters of their movement is in Idlib. It’s not in Xinjiang. It’s not even in in Central Asia, it’s not in Afghanistan, it’s in Idlib, Syria. That’s the headquarters. I met them on the border of the Turkey and Syria. They had been involved in various attacks. They’d been part of ISIS. Some of them had been in various al-Qaida groups, Jabhat al-Nusra in its earlier iteration. These men mainly came back to Central Asia. They got into Xinjiang. They conducted terror activities. But I also want to say that they were produced by a problem, which was this kind of neglect of the region, the kind of increasing levels of disparity. When Xi Jinping comes to office in 2013 he develops this theory of One Belt, One Road, and that eventually gets called the Belt and Road.

And they push hard on trying to eliminate as many disparities as possible and particularly to eliminate disparities that are faced by minority people. So the poverty, the abolition of extreme poverty, Xi Jinping and others are on record. China has lifted 800 million people out of poverty since 1949. The last hundred million were the hardest to to find the way out, largely because many of them were ethnic minorities where they had been neglected and face it, there are some problems. There are social hierarchies in China that had to be confronted. Mao wrote about this in the early years: we’ve got to stop Han chauvinism. This is a lot like Lenin’s writings against greater Russian chauvinism. You’ve got to confront the fact that there are these chauvinisms and so on. So Xi Jinping put a lot of emphasis on trying to get rid of disparities between the majority population and the minorities. And this is where Xinjiang becomes in a sense. ground zero, so does Kunming, so do other provinces. So what you see actually is a combination of various things. Poverty alleviation. Re-education of people who have been seduced into some of these terroristic kind of Islamic groups. It’s a combination of all these things happening in Xinjiang now.

Now what’s partly frustrating is that the the the the kind of communication that comes from Washington, D.C. and other places about what’s happening in Xinjiang is unwilling to entertain these complexities. It’s unwilling to entertain the issue of minorities who are fighting themselves to get out of poverty, fighting themselves to improve their conditions.

Justin Podur: It’s not just unwilling to entertain —

Vijay Prashad: — I mean, one of the interesting features, just just let me finish this one interesting feature of this, Justin, is the question of mechanization. There was a statement made about slave labor in southern Xinjiang in the cotton belt. I would like to see John Deere come out and make a public statement about the number of heavy machinery it has sold the government and private companies in southern Xinjiang. John Deere has made a lot of money selling heavy machinery in that part of the world. If you have heavy machinery in the cotton production, what slave labor? I talked to a professor in Urumqi on this issue. She has written a PhD on this. She says, look, there are great problems. For the laborers, there are lots of problems, just as there are problems for workers all across the world. But it doesn’t come to the level of slavery or anything like that. There are struggles that must be taken seriously, but it’s different than saying, it’s slavery, it’s genocide. These are very difficult words. And in fact, rather than elucidate, they shut off discussion.

Justin Podur: Yeah, and that’s what I was going to say. You were very euphemistic when you said there on the literature coming out of Washington is unwilling to confront the complexities. The literature coming out of Washington comes from one Christian Evangelical End Times guy named Adrian Zenz. And it’s not just unwilling to confront the complexities, it’s willing to make up stuff out of whole cloth, the information is so bad that it’s hard to — that’s that’s one of the biggest problems is like it’s really hard to believe any claim that the U.S. makes out about what’s what’s going on in any — I mean, that’s true for Iran, it’s true for Yemen, it’s true for Venezuela or Cuba. But it’s also very true for China.

Vijay Prashad: And well, the sad part of it is that, they manipulate the reality where there are bits and pieces of truth. There are bits and pieces of truth which are put under heavy concepts that make you feel like something horrible is transpiring. But the bits and pieces of truth: There have been neglect of minority people. Nobody’s denying that in Beijing. In fact, there are documents written about this that directed people in the poverty alleviation campaign to focus on the question of minority disparity. So they take that, little bits and pieces of the disparity literature, or they take bits and pieces of the fact that, the Chinese government is going after people who have been influenced by this ideology. The kind of jihadist ideology. This is the 20th anniversary of Guantanamo’s being set up. I’m not saying that there’s a perfect way to deal with the fact of some sort of ideology that is committed to mass murder or whatever. I don’t know if there’s a perfect way to do it.

But certainly this is not as bad as going in a wholesale bombing a country into extinction. Even what the Russians did in Chechnya. You’re not seeing that in Xinjiang. I mean, what the Americans did in Iraq, what the Russians did in Chechnya, what the British did during colonial times where they just said, we’re going to go and bomb the savages. You don’t see that happening in Xinjiang. Whatever you see, maybe it may trouble your appetite. It may be a problem. But it doesn’t rise to the level of the kind of terrible violence that we saw in Iraq. That I saw in Iraq. I saw how almost every family in Baghdad was marked by the killing marked by the trauma of that war, which I don’t even know if it’s over yet, Justin. That’s the thing or the kind of behavior of the dirty wars in Central America in the 1980s. None of this rises to that standard.

Justin Podur: And the cultural genocide accusations also don’t hold up, there’s language, there’s signage, there’s language education in Uyghur. The accusation seems to be that if you’re learning Mandarin as a second language, that’s cultural genocide. Meanwhile, again, in Canada, Indigenous Nations have been demanding education in their own languages for at least two generations. And it’s like, “Oh, we’re in the wealthiest country in the world, we can’t find the money for it.” But China, where the per capita income is far lower, they do. They find resources to keep the language not just alive, but to make sure that every kid has an education in their own language.

Vijay Prashad: I mean, the behavior of the Indian government in Kashmir is far worse than anything that I’ve seen in some of these provinces. And by the way, you use the phrase cultural genocide. In international law literature, there is no such phrase. There is a there is a convention against genocide. Genocide should not be minimized. That’s where you kill people. You know where you come in to do a genocide, genocide, that’s the killing of an entire people. There’s been a long debate in the UN about the term cultural genocide. It’s rejected. Article Two of the Convention on Genocide actually, it talks about how it’s it’s a crime to take children away from their families and put them somewhere else and educate them. That’s the experience of Canada.

Justin Podur: They said that because of Canada. It is not an abstract thing. They put that in there because of Canada.

Vijay Prashad: That’s Article two of the Genocide Convention. The term cultural genocide has been rejected over the years. In fact, closest it came into the various U.N. things was when there was a deliberation about the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous people. There was a discussion about whether the term cultural genocide should be brought in. And this is in 1994. In Article Seven, I really I remember this as if it was yesterday this debate, because I have long had strong feelings about how people’s culture is taken away from them. The term was not adopted because again, lots of countries felt let’s not minimize the concept genocide. That means the killing of people. Taking away of your culture, this is now entering a complicated area because you see, you could then argue — the Indian government, a rightwing Indian government could argue anti Brahminism is cultural genocide. You can’t commit genocide against Brahmins. Brahmins should be allowed to exercise their culture. For God’s sake, I want to obliterate Brahmin culture.

Justin Podur: Brahmin culture is like, you can’t look this person in the eye and you can’t eat with them and you can’t.

Vijay Prashad: Yeah, why can’t somebody turn around and say patriarchy is my culture? No, patriarchy is not your culture. We are going to fight patriarchy and bring it out from the ground. Root out all the root of it. And so that’s the reason why there was hesitancy because people knew what will happen is and remember, this is 1994. This debate has been going from the 1948 convention on Genocide till the nineties, right through the period of the nineteen sixties, when new cultural forms were appearing, people were talking about women’s rights, gay rights, people talking about the rights of minorities and so on. All of that was on the table now. Why couldn’t the white supremacist government in South Africa, the apartheid government say, Oh my God, our culture is apartheid.

Justin Podur: They did! And the Peculiar Institution, in the U.S. South. That was one of their main arguments, right?

Vijay Prashad: So this is the reason why the term cultural genocide did not become law because there was great hesitancy, because you and I know, other people know, people who suffer from the other side of culture know that there are some things that we have to rip out root and branch. Root and branch. In Tibet, for instance, when the Lamas were in charge, the wretched feudal conditions for the serfs must be recognized and put on the table. Whatever you feel about the role of the Dalai Lama in the world, the wretched way in which the Lamas ran Tibet has to be put on the table now. I don’t believe that of all cultural artifacts or heritages of course. I was very upset when I saw the Bamiyan Buddhas get blown up by the Taliban. We don’t want to destroy museums. But the social relations of hierarchy, Justin, social relations of hierarchy. We are not zoo animals, OK? We don’t want to have that preserved, we want to destroy it. Call it modernization, call it whatever you want. But if you start calling that cultural genocide, you will drift immediately to the Right because you will then give an opening to Mr. Narendra Modi to say caste is our culture, and therefore any attempt to get rid of caste is the genocide of our culture. God forbid you take that position.

Justin Podur: The last thing is, again, something I’ve observed, it seems to be your turn. Because every few months it seems to me there’s an article about tankies or campists. And it’s in left publication. There’s a left publication, the most recent one was like, there’s this debate on the left wing of the Democratic Party, what to do about China? How do we formulate a policy about China within sort of like as an internal to the U.S. debate? What kind of position should the U.S. left take on China? Rhetorically, I suppose. And the problem is that there’s all these tankies and all these campists, and they keep trying to push this anti imperialism, and it’s divisive. It’s dividing the left wing of the Democratic Party. It’s dividing the Democratic Socialists of America. And this article concludes with this thing where they say, during the last Cold War, the U.S. monopolized freedom and and the USSR monopolized the discourse of peace. And, it seems like we can’t have both. And, I don’t know what we’re going to do about China.

And the other the other pattern that I notice is, they go after individuals, too. So I remember during the Syria, when Syria was big, they went after Rania Khalek in a big way and they were like, Rania Khalek is an Assadist. And it’s like never really about the individual. They target people, they hope, I think, that the tankies will disassociate from this because we don’t want to get criticized the way Rania is getting criticized, because that’s really nasty. And now it looks like it’s it’s your turn. So, congratulations, I guess.

Vijay Prashad: I suppose. I mean, the striking thing, Justin, is that in the one paragraph where I appear in this article, there are two different places where the journalist essentially puts words into my mouth. Once he says, this is sort of what he must be saying. And he says, Well, it may be somewhere around here. I mean, that to me, is outrageous. If you’re not clear… I spoke to the journalist. If the journalist is not clear about what I said to him, he had my phone number. He could have called me till the very last moment to say, Can you clarify?

Justin Podur: He could have literally said what he wrote. He could have said, Hey, it sounds like you’re saying that destruction of indigenous people’s cultures is good. Is that what you’re saying, Vijay? Because it doesn’t sound like something you would say.

Vijay Prashad: Thirty years plus of writing over 30 books, thousands of articles in which I’ve been very clear about my opinions on British rule in India, on the the the massacre of native people, genocide of native people in the Americas. Very clear in all the stuff that I’ve written to then suggest that my analogy, I was suggesting that I believed it was OK to conduct the genocide of native people. I find that not only to be disingenuous. That’s libel. And I’ve written a letter to the editors of The Nation. I hope they publish it. Unfortunately, in the United States, libel laws are very weak. They actually protect the person who makes the libelous statement. So there’s no point going on that road. But I have written to The Nation and I know this is libel. The the journalist has libeled me. And I have nothing to feel embarrassed about or ashamed of. I have strong opinions. I will not bow from those opinions. Honestly, I don’t care what your position is on China, but I do hope that people are against the war that is being built up against China because that’s extinction.

Justin Podur: But the facts also matter, right? Because they can make a claim that anybody is committing genocide. And then if you say, “Well, I don’t think the facts hold up that claim” you become a genocide denier, which is like a Holocaust denier, which is like the worst thing you can be, so…

Vijay Prashad: Some of this is a carryover from Syria. I mean, I find that many of the people —

Justin Podur: Still mad at you, they’re still —

Vijay Prashad: Angry with me for whatever reporting I did from inside Syria, including Qalamoun and from northern Syria, in the Turkish border and so on. They still hate me for my reporting in Syria. Some of them still hate me for my reporting in Libya. These are just people who have an axe to grind. And I get it. I’m sorry, you don’t like what I say, and I’m sorry that you’re upset that people read me. That’s what really is bothersome to people. I’m sorry about all that. Go and write your own stories, tell your own stories. Why are you so obsessed with me? Why do you constantly harass people who maybe refer to me or or tweet something that — these people are obsessive. Then I wonder, are they real? And that’s a serious question, given revelations about the troll farms in India.

Justin Podur: There’s also the — there’s right there in the congressional record, there’s like hundreds of millions of dollars for media who attack China and and, try to attack China’s favorable impression in the world. A law was passed for like $300 million a year for that. It’s just it’s a lot of money to leave on the table if you’re a media operation. It’s it’s the thing about these kind of Cold War literature fights, right? Like Louis Allday has said this. He’s like, we know now in the seventies that there were all kinds of shenanigans where the state was involved in funding these kinds of Cold War anti-communist programs. We’ll only know that the details of today’s programs 30 years from now. But he idea that they’ve stopped? The idea that this just ended in the seventies strikes me as kind of unlikely. So, keeping the U.S. left clean of tankies, trying to drive anti-imperialism out of U.S. politics at every turn, I think is a is a very important agenda item for them. And so anybody like you who who writes a lot and develops even a modest following, not to understate your following.

Vijay Prashad: All I would say to the U.S. government and its various acolytes and so on is good luck. I mean, good luck with what you’re trying to do. Basically, history is against you. Most people around the world looking at these matters understand that. The United States government comes at them with guns and with terrible deals on paper. The Cubans come with doctors. The Chinese come with doctors and with various kinds of aid and sometimes with bad deals as well, OK? Those are there, but they also come with other things. They don’t come and bomb them. Know when is the last time the Chinese government has bombed a country on the African continent? Or when is the last time the Cubans have gone and destabilized a government? Let’s grow up, guys. History is against you. History is against imperialism. You have to face it. And all these people who are basically hand wringing liberal imperialists, they need to get with the program. You think we’ve got to make a choice between — what was it, peace and and freedom? You’ve got to make a choice, but I don’t believe so. I believe in peace and freedom. You’re hand-wringing over what choice you’re going to make. I believe in peace and freedom, and we are going to win. And that’s it.

Justin Podur: Vijay Prashad, thank you for joining me today.

Vijay Prashad: Thanks a lot.

2021 in Review, 2022 Anti-Empire Plans

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Hello everyone. I hope this finds you all surviving and preparing for the end of the year tomorrow. Usually around this time of year I send a little review of what the Anti-Empire Project has been up to and some vague thoughts about what we might do next year.

The main thing to report of course is the book that came out from Monthly Review co-authored by Joe Emersberger, Extraordinary Threat: The US Empire, the Media, and Twenty Years of Coup Attempts in Venezuela. I’m really proud to be associated with Monthly Review and with Joe.

Besides that, I noticed that I seem to be averaging about five articles a year for the past few years. The pace can be attributed partly to the Independent Media Institute Globetrotter Project’s exacting standards and editorial process and partly that I’ve gravitated to writing longer and more researched articles, rather than the quick reactions I used to write in the 2010s and earlier. The three Independent Media Institute articles are these:

Canada is Waging an All-Front Legal War Against Indigenous People August 6, 2021

Is Colombia’s Military Displacing Peasants to Protect the Environment or Sell of Natural Resources? May 20, 2021

India’s Right-Wing Government is So Hungry for Profit It Will Risk Famine March 19, 2021

I also wrote my first article for the fantastic Covert Action Magazine, and it was a doozie at 8,000 words: Limited Hangouts: Western Intellectuals Whitewash Horrific Crimes of CIA Asset Paul Kagame – November 11, 2021.

During the war on Gaza earlier in the year I released something I’d been working on for a few years: a resource on anti-Palestinian racism: Anti-Palestinian Racism: A Resource.

On the podcast, I followed a few stories closely on the news/politics side (which I’m going to start calling Anti-Empire Radio starting from now), especially the case of Meng Wanzhou which I was very happy to see concluded with Meng returning safely to China (my coverage of it since 2020 is here: https://podur.org/tag/meng-wanzhou/). We covered India, including the Indian Farmers, as well as some China-India stories with Carl Zha (https://podur.org/category/india-and-pakistan/). We did some really good special broadcasts on the Gaza War with Tarek Loubani as well as Jon Elmer and Nora Barrows-Friedman from The Brief and a 4-part series of short episodes with Dan Freeman-Maloy, all here: https://podur.org/category/palestine/. We continued our many collaborations with the marvelous Sina Rahmani of The East is a Podcast.

But a major confluence that occurred was that on the history side of the podcast (aka the Civilizations Series, with David Power) we covered Afghanistan in depth a few months before the US withdrawal from the country. The result is some deep historical and contemporary material pertinent to the Afghanistan withdrawal (https://podur.org/category/afghanistan-war/).

We’ll be following all of these areas in 2022 as well. At Civilizations, we’ll be concluding the Scramble for Africa and moving on to the 20th Century, World War 1, 2, and beyond. I’m at the research stage for three other big things, two nonfictional and one fictional, and some smaller ones too.

What are your 2022 plans?

Why you should subscribe to Dan Freeman-Maloy’s anti-racist substack

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The holidays are approaching

With the holidays approaching, I suspect you must be thinking, “what encyclopedically researched anti-racist newsletters are there that I could subscribe to?” Well, you are in luck. Dan Freeman-Maloy’s substack, Check the Liner Notes, has come out with another newsletter and will be writing regularly. Support his work by subscribing. Maybe gift a subscription to a loved one (who loves to read long, well researched newsletters).

In other news, Dave Power and I are continuing our Scramble for Africa series, please check that out as we’re 10 episodes in with much more to come. And on Africa, I had an 8,000 word article about Rwanda (reviewing a new book about Rwanda) in Covert Action Magazine (in case your appetite for long-reads hasn’t been sated by Dan’s newsletter).

But here’s a sample from Dan’s latest: https://freemanmaloy.substack.com/p/what-does-the-white-mans-burden-mean

What does “the White Man’s Burden” Mean? by Dan Freeman-Maloy

December 1, 2021

The phrase “the White Man’s Burden” is, syllable for syllable, probably the most iconic thing ever written in the English-language history of racism. But what does it mean?

In short, it means gaslighting. The concept of gaslighting has moved into discussions of empire and racial myth from the field of relationship psychology. Fittingly, the term is adapted from a play, Gas Light, set in late Victorian England. The British Empire in the late decades of Queen Victoria’s reign (1837–1901) was a powerhouse of gaslighting the likes of which the world has rarely seen. One of its gifts to the world was the slogan, “White Man’s Burden.”

In 1955, in his inimitable Discourse on Colonialism, Aimé Césaire warned against getting too caught up in changes in imperial surface language, in his time or in ours. “Don’t let the subtleties of vocabulary, the new terminology, frighten you,” he said; “be reassured! At the start of the journey it may seem a bit difficult, but once you get there, you’ll see, you will find all your baggage again. Nothing will be missing, not even the famous white man’s burden” (p. 60).

Guidance of that sort seems to me too invaluable for us to forget.

For now, I reproduce the below as a follow-up to my last research note, “On Swastikas & Research Method.” In coming posts, I will dig deeper into the racially coded imperial myths that German wordsmiths tried to keep “unbewusst” (unconcious), that English wordsmiths tried to keep “inductive” (see my last note), and which Kipling boldly celebrated as “the lies I tell.”

Taking up the “White Man’s Burden” in Dixie

We can start with the Ku Klux Klan.

The single most accomplished Klan publicist of all time, Thomas Dixon, was a big Kipling fan. Dixon spent the early years of the twentieth century promoting Klan hatreds in a series of popular books. He entitled the first of these books in a double homage to Kipling, The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden (1902). While Dixon’s subtitle declared the selflessness of white-power politics, his title echoed one of Kipling’s tales of anti-Black racism.

These lies carried power and prestige. After the abolition of slavery in the United States, the terror squads of the Klan did not work in isolation. Their violence was the cutting edge of the white backlash. But it had wider support. The horror of lynchings, then, was inseparable from the wider U.S. assault on Black people after emancipation. This assault on Black life now stands exposed as “one of the most stupendous efforts the world ever saw to discredit human beings, an effort involving universities, history, science, social life and religion” (p. 55). Dixon helped to push it forward, doing his utmost to boost the worst white supremacists’ morale and reputation.

Dixon’s title, The Leopard’s Spots, took its cue from one of Kipling’s children’s stories, “How the Leopard got its spots” (1901). For twelve decades, this story has served as a tool of racist acculturation for any teachers or parents willing to resort to it.

The moral of the story is that dark skin is an irremediable, even a contagious, human fault. Kipling seized upon a phrase that was translated as follows in the King James Bible: “Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard change his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil.” Kipling used this imagery to instill a hateful sense of anti-Blackness in the minds of all children who could be made to read along or listen.

Once upon a time, Kipling begins, “everybody started fair.” We will return to this word, fair. Then came darkness. Kipling taught (teaches?) children that darkness came to the leopard when “the Ethiopian put five fingers together . . . and pressed them all over the Leopard, and wherever the five fingers touched they left little black marks.” This is from Kipling’s Just So Stories. My copy, reprinted in 2000 by Penguin, features a leopard’s tail dangling provocatively across the cover.

You can see above how our cultural mainstream continues to gaslight. And in Klan terms, you can see why Dixon appreciated Kipling. The bogeyman of “race-mixing” or “miscegenation” was a favourite lynchers’ theme. Kipling’s story played it up.

Once again, however, the full title of Dixon’s book was The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden. And where Kipling really excelled was in the transition from the theme of the title of Dixon’s book to the theme of its subtitle, that is, from anti-Blackness to romantic white innocence.

This brings us back to the word “fair.” Modern English investors owed an enormous proportion of their wealth to the exploitation of Africans.1 English dictionary-writers were thus eager to make the virtues of whiteness a matter of definition. Little wonder that in standard imperial English, “fair” was a moral as well as a physical description. “Light as opposed to dark,” the Oxford English Dictionary explained, was one of the word’s meanings. But for the OED, to be fair was not only to be free of physical spots – “Clean, unsoiled, unstained” – but also to be clean in “character, conduct, reputation: Free from moral stain, spotless, unblemished.”2 This story was told by generations of well-financed experts in barrels of Oxbridge and Ivy League ink.

Now, Kipling celebrated the English racialist as a “Puzzler” in tribute to this history of deception. But here we encounter a mild contradiction. On the one hand, Kipling celebrated racial mastery as the property of Englishmen above all others. He never tired of this theme: “the English – ah, the English! – they are quite a race apart.” On the other hand, Kipling layered Englishness into a wider white supremacy. Racism is always a pack of lies – but its contradictions are not random.

Kipling’s supreme lie was that white-power politics are a generous service to non-Europeans targeted by empire. This is the key point. The equation of whiteness with selflessness, and of imperialism with charity, was the central theme of Kipling’s gaslighting. But for a moment, let us pick apart the more basic theme, “whiteness” . . .

. . . or not. In his classic bit about the “Romanian cracker” (timestamp 45:11), Chris Rock expressed a hilarious dismissal of the niceties internal to whiteness; “we don’t got time to dice white people up into little groups.” The point is as fair as it is funny, and I ask those impatient with the dicing to please skip the next section.

Details on Kipling’s supreme lie – white-power-as-charity – can be found below, under the heading “Don’t run. We are your friends.” But for those with the patience, let us first look for a moment at the specifically English or Anglo-Saxonist racism around which white nationalism really did develop.

White nationalism and the “Anglo-Saxon’s burden”

Paul Martin, Jr., featured in the photo above, modelled the “White Man’s Burden” with a sense of heritage. It was autumn 2004, and this Canadian prime minister was visiting Haiti to confirm Canada’s support for the overthrow of Haiti’s elected government and the repression of Haiti’s main mass-based political party. Enter the Globe and Mail, the principal newspaper of central Canadian capital.

Kipling could not have written it better. The Globe did not mention the name of the girl featured in its photo, whom it identified only as “a resident of the Timkatec orphanage in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.” But it found a way to present Martin’s cynical power politics as charity. Proud, prime ministerial fingers are shown directing a Haitian forearm to wave a Canadian flag for the camera.

“Bigre, mes chers collèges (comme on dit), je vous ôte mon chapeau (mon chapeau d’anthropophage, bien entendu).”

With Martin, all ambiguity is removed. This is not Johnny-come-lately whiteness but the thing itself, in all of its vintage prestige. But let us step back for a moment. Just who and what is “white”?

In earlier centuries, some claimed that Englishmen possessed this title almost alone. “The number of purely white people in the world is proportionably very small,” Benjamin Franklin wrote from Pennsylvania, in the days when it still fell under British rule. Franklin continued:

All Africa is black or tawny; Asia chiefly tawny; America (exclusive of the newcomers) wholly so. And in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians, and Swedes are generally of what we call a swarthy complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who, with the English, make the principal body of white people on the face of the earth. I could wish their numbers were increased.3

So for this racial storyteller, some of the Germans – the “Saxons,” i.e., those from Saxony – made the cut, as did the English, who according to modern racial lore were “Anglo-Saxons.” But that was about it.

The question of whether any very poor person could be considered fully white lingered for centuries. By the late nineteenth century, a leading French racialist, Gustave Le Bon, could also crudely gender his standard racist tropes. Le Bon wrote that even among the “superior races” of his imagination, “as among the Parisians, there are a large number of women whose brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most developed male brains.” It was old wine in new bottles.

That is the basic story of racism: the recasting of old oppressive hierarchies in new naturalized forms. “The vulgar, primitive, over-simple racism,” observed Frantz Fanon, “purported to find in biology – the Scriptures having proved insufficient – the material basis of the doctrine.”4 Ergo, European Christendom was the best, and its rich better than its poor, and its men better than its women, etc., etc. Own enough universities and such self-serving prattle can be made to sound pretty. Plus ça change.

Meanwhile, the U.S. led the way toward white nationalism. Toward the end of Benjamin Franklin’s life, the U.S. break with Britain meant that British nationality was no longer in play. Congress invited all “free white persons” to become U.S. nationals. A whiteness including various European nationalities emerged, defined against an Indigenous and Black foil. Generations of racialist experts argued that to include more white people was to broaden the basis for white racial power over others. John Van Evrie, a Canadian-born white supremacist, was especially enthusiastic about this point.

After abolition, Van Evrie cheered on Klan violence from New York. He summarized his argument in an 1870 book entitled, White Supremacy and Negro Subordination: Or, Negroes a Subordinate Race, and (So-Called) Slavery its Normal Condition. What Orwell never really taught us was that slavery = freedom is above all a white lie, even if English patriots prefer to call it a red one.

For Van Evrie, “can’t we all just get along” was a battle cry for white-power hatreds. He wrote: “The Englishman believes that the English are alone truly Christian and civilized; the Frenchman honestly believes that La Belle France is at the head of modern civilization; even the advanced and liberal American Democrat thinks, and perhaps correctly, that the Americans alone are truly civilized.”5 Van Evrie’s message was that all white-on-white rivalry or violence was wasted energy, better poured into the unified violence of anti-Black and imperial politics.

So anti-Black and imperial violence defined the “White Man’s Burden.” But whiteness needed first to be made in order to be used as a weapon. In Kipling’s work, readers will thus find a dual commitment to white power and to Anglo-Saxon power. This logic was explicit. It was spelled out in Kipling’s day by the most influential U.S. racial theorist of the period, William Z. Ripley.

Visiting Britain in 1908, Ripley told his hosts that Kipling’s “burden” should really be split into two, especially in North America. Yes, Ripley insisted, it was great for the British to plunder India, for the Klan to gallop across Dixie, and for the U.S. army to devastate the Philippines. But white nationalism needed special attention. Ripley said:

You have your ‘white man’s burden’ to bear in India; we have ours to bear with the American negro and the Filipinos. But an even greater responsibility with us and with your Canadian fellow-citizens is that of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’s burden’ – to so nourish, uplift and inspire all these immigrant peoples of Europe, that in due course of time . . . the torch of Anglo-Saxon civilization and ideals, born by our fathers from England to America, shall yet burn as bright and clear in the New World, as your fires have continued to illuminate the old.6

Like all white supremacist theory, this was nonsense, but it was nonsense with a logic. Ripley was spelling out a program that combined the primacy of British conservative social norms – and the English language – with the pan-European demographic and striking force sought by Van Evrie.

Those who do not care about Canada should now really skip to the next section. But strictly speaking, while Ripley bracketed Canada together with the U.S., the situation here was a little different. In this case, there was no break with the British Empire: a specifically British dominance endured. Until the 1940s, there was not even a specifically Canadian citizenship. Canadians were officially classed as British imperial subjects. Relatedly, in celebration of this imperial connection, British Protestant sectarian groups like the Orange Order (do sample some Fenian-blood–lust) retained power at the expense of white nationalism as such. Not until after World War II was Canada’s British imperial connection painted over.

This brings us to Paul Martin, Sr., father to the twenty-first century Canadian prime minister. In 1946, it was Martin, Sr. who introduced the Citizenship Act for Canada. Thenceforth, Martin declared with white ecumenism, Canadians would be more than British nationals. Martin said: “No matter where we come from or what our origins, French, English, Scandinavian, Scottish, Ukrainian, Irish or whatever else, one thing at least we can all be, and that is Canadians.”7 In this telling, the story of British or dual British–French nationality gave way to a story of composite Canadian whiteness.

In a master stroke of hypocrisy, this record was then removed from the field of popular education and debate. Organized confusion is the upshot. “The truth,” one candid historian wrote as early as 1981, “is that we are a very confused people. We have invented for ourselves a false national identity to conform with the historical myth of Canadian nationalism which we have created from very little hard evidence.”8

Granted, layers of multiculturalist paint have since been applied to the old Canadian social structure. But specialists agree that the appearance is altogether misleading. It now falls to a few academics to joke at the expense of those of us who were kept in the dark about Canada’s imperial foundations. One quips: “To paraphrase Kipling, ‘What should they know of Canada who only Canada know?’”

It will take work to free these quips from specialists and develop a popular anti-racist discussion grounded in the historical record – as distinct from amnesiac national branding. What is meanwhile plain is that the strongest local traditions of gaslighting could not have developed in a few decades, or even in a few generations. They are as vintage as a Rosedale wine cellar. As C.L.R. James warned: “That calm confidence in its capacity to deceive is a mark of the mature ruling class.”

“Don’t run. We are your friends”

Finally, we return to Rudyard Kipling. So long as his mockery remains obscure, the roots of contemporary racist gaslighting are likewise hidden.

Hollywood put Kipling’s politics to film in its 1996 spoof, Mars Attacks! The film features a Martian invasion of earth. The invaders claim with a poker face that they come in peace. It is the plainest lie. But the confusion it causes on the part of earthlings is too convenient for the Martians to abandon. So even as the invaders raid and kill, they stick to the script. In one scene, satirized Martian shock troops storm a US street, firing their weapons while professing their innocence: “Don’t run. We are your friends.”

Eight decades before the spoof, Kipling’s take on this story was played out in India. It was then, in 1919, that the British Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer fired 1,650 rounds of live ammunition – by his own estimate – at Indian demonstrators who had dared to gather in public in their own country against British wishes. To think that British rule in India was ending, Dyer explained, was to be guilty, and the sentence against the crowd was open massacre. “I fired and continued to fire,” he boasted. “If more troops had been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion.”

Crucially, Dyer maintained that this massacre was an act of friendship to India – as British rule always was – and that Indians “ought to be thankful to me for doing it.” Kipling could only nod at his pupil’s wisdom: “He did his duty as he saw it.”9 The tradition of Kipling and Dyer was a tradition in which first-person compassion was asserted as an article of faith, all facts be damned.

What was empire, so the story went, if not a gift to those it conquered? Kipling joked about this ruse in an early poem entitled “Et Dona Ferentes,” from the proverb, “Beware Greeks bearing gifts.” Kipling made it clear to his readers that even the fiercest exploitation and hate should be made to sound kind, or at least kept quiet. In the idealized racist of Kipling’s poetry, “the hard, pent rage ate inward,” before striking out with sharp violence and then disappearing without a harsh word. Such was the mastery of the imperial figure whom Kipling idealized as the Puzzler: “When his lips are schooled to meekness, when his back is bowed to blows – / Well the keen aas-vogels know it – well the waiting jackal knows.”

In sum, Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” was an ode to the waiting jackal.

Kipling was a product of the British imperial community that ruled India, which had been wrapping the gift of empire in Dyer’s manner for generations. Empowered by its Atlantic exploits, Britain first broke through resistance to its advance in India in the eighteenth century. What followed was the plainest plunder. In the words of one English historian, “No eighteenth-century nabob, as the plunderers of India were called, pretended that he laboured for the benefit of the Indians. He laboured in order to become a millionaire.”10 Over time, the means became more subtle, but the profits continued to flow. By 1932, a British author could forget Kipling’s script and spell it out in dollars and cents. “It has been computed,” he wrote, “that every fifth man in Great Britain is dependent, either directly or indirectly, on our Indian connection for his livelihood.”

The Big Lie that British rule was a gift to India was a fateful and world-destructive joke. Never has wealth flowed from one country to another as wealth flowed from India to Britain during the colonial period. The scope of what happened is suggested by statistics published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 1700, on the eve of British expansion, India contributed nearly a quarter of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) against three percent for Britain. By 1870 India’s share had been cut in half while Britain’s had tripled. By late Victorian times, Indians were dying of famine while British wealth poured into universities that celebrated white fairness as an article of faith.

Kipling argued that the lessons of British India generalized: white power the world over should be wrapped as a gift from Europe to the rest of the world. This was the meaning of his poem, “The White Man’s Burden.” Kipling coached his readers to stick to the script, à la Mars Attacks! Proclaim white-power selflessness, Kipling told his readers; whatever the facts, say it again and again: “By open speech and simple, / An Hundred times made plain, / To seek another’s profit, / And work another’s gain.”

In the Canadian North-West as in India, colonized people were reeling from famines that the British authorities had ruthlessly exploited. Pretend, Kipling mocked, that empire comes to the colonized with no attacks and no malice, just bundles of food and medicine: “Take up the White Man’s burden – / The savage wars of peace – / Fill full the mouth of famine / And bid the sickness cease.”

Kipling aimed to define colonial oppression out of existence – white power equals charity equals white power – and in this way to make anti-colonial resistance to oppression a logical impossibility. One can resist oppression. But one cannot resist charity. To resist charity is not resistance at all: it is ingratitude, insolence. In anti-colonial resistance, Kipling therefore coached, racists should refuse to see anything but “The blame of those ye better, / The hate of these ye guard.”

But why would the bearers of empire’s gifts be blamed in the first place? Why would racists receive anything but thanks for, say, the friendship they would show in Jallianwala Bagh, or in Canadian residential schools? Kipling answered with six syllables of carefully crafted hate. He declared that colonized people were “Half-devil and half-child.” The phrase is sharpened to purpose like a knife’s edge. On the one hand, it restates the case for imperial tutelage: if colonized people are racially immature, so the story goes, then they must, in empire’s manner, be taught a lesson. On the other hand, the charge of demonic immaturity makes room for righteous hate even within empire’s educational mission. The result is a self-righteousness fitted to a cruelty both pious and profitable.

By the early twentieth century, Britain’s Lord Cromer could only smile. Cromer sat on an enormous family fortune from the trade in enslaved Africans. Then, without returning a dime, he helped to lead the Scramble for Africa. And after all of this, he felt confident demanding not only the continued European exploitation of Africans, but also their thanks. “Even the Central African savage,” Cromer quipped, “may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honour of Astraea Redux, as represented by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice.” The mockery is astounding.

After Dyer, pushing Anglo-Indian friendship to its classical conclusions; after Cromer, marketing false humanitarianism as profitable (see the link immediately above); and after Kipling, with his pride in the “waiting jackal” – after all of this, the politeness of the powerful has lost all benefit of the doubt. Hateful words can be terrible. But silence can say just as much. All this time later, there is every reason to make Kipling’s warning the baseline for decent thought and action: “oh, beware my country, when my country grows polite!

Canada in Haiti: A retraction

I conclude with a retraction.

Some time ago, I wrote that Canadian policy in Haiti combined professed good intentions with oppressive policies. I began one article, now a decade old: “Over the course of the past decade, Canada’s leading officials and most prestigious commentators have learned how to approach Haiti in the spirit of cynical power politics and racist condescension (or worse) while maintaining a posture of national self-flattery.”

At the time, I did not know the precedents. But the claim that this dates to the first decade of this century is wrong. It is much older. In fact, empire’s twenty-first century arguments on Haiti were anticipated even by that distant imperial icon, Henry Dundas, whose legacy has loomed so large in the public architecture of Toronto.

Notwithstanding the error, that brief article does unpack the context for the ghastly Haiti photo featured above. You can refer to the article here.

1

The exploitation of Africans and their overseas descendants was a fulcrum of English and then British economic development throughout the modern period. The details are poorly publicized but well documented. Eric Williams, who went on to serve as the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, established this point as early as 1944 in a landmark study available here <https://archive.org/details/capitalismslaver0000unse>. A fuller review of the record can now be found in Joseph E. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

2

Henry Bradley, A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. IV, edited by James A.H. Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 26.

3

As quoted in Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Harvard, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 40.

4

Frantz Fanon, “Racism and culture,” in Toward the African Revolution, translated by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 36.

5

J.H. Van Evrie, White Supremacy and Negro Subordination: Or, Negroes a Subordinate Race and (So-Called) Slavery its Normal Condition (New York: Van Evrie, Horton & Co., 1870), 67.

6

William Z. Ripley, “The European population of the United States,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (38 (1908), 240.

7

As quoted in Sunera Thobani, Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 89.

8

John E. Flint, “Reflexions on British Imperial and Canadian History,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 15, no. 1 (1981), 53.

9

As quoted in Derek Sayer, “British reaction to the Amritsar massacre, 1919–1920,” Past & Present 131 (1991), 146 & 158.

10

A.J.P. Taylor, “Conquerors and profiteers,” in Essays in English History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 30.

The New Deal, Racism, and War

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Why do they call it a Green New Deal? What was the New Deal?

[Last year I was lucky enough to be invited by Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial to submit a discussion on the international dimensions of the Green New Deal, and I thought I’d use it as a way to discuss the original New Deal, and its historical (imperialist) context. My punch line was we might do better to think in terms of Green Five Year Plans than Green New Deals. In any case, The Ecologist Magazine republished the essay, which had originally appeared in an edited collection published by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. In case you missed it, here’s the essay — Justin]

https://theecologist.org/2021/oct/04/new-deal-racism-and-war

The original New Deal, and its champion, Franklin D. Roosevelt, are credited with saving the US economy from the Great Depression – and perhaps preventing the country from adopting ‘socialism’.

The New Deal is the inspiration behind the contemporary call for a Green New Deal. But its history is remains contested. The story is told in Stan Cox’s recent book The Green New Deal and Beyond.

Planning

In 1932, US unemployment was at 24 percent. The New Deal started by designating $3.3 billion for public works, an amount larger than the entire federal budget just three years before.

Roosevelt created new agencies to try to steer private industry into a gentle, voluntary form of economic planning.

In 1935, the Supreme Court struck down one of these initiatives – the National Recovery Act. But that same year, the New Dealers started a Works Progress Administration (WPA) that hired eight million unemployed Americans to build public infrastructure.

The New Deal also took place in a time of unremitting white terror towards black people in the US south. The New Deal programmes helped cement racial inequalities. Federal relief agencies paid locally prevailing wages, allowing lower wages in the US south.

Black sharecroppers’ government benefits were kept by their white landlords. White plantation owners would receive federal compensation for cotton extracted from land, and then turn around and evict the black tenants that worked the land anyway.

Social Security did not cover farm workers or domestic workers – the occupations that employed two thirds of black workers.

Spending

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) required banks to perpetuate segregation: “If a neighbourhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes,” the FHA underwriting manual instructed.

Despite this, the New Deal faced elite opposition, and so Roosevelt reduced stimulus funds by 25 percent between 1936-8. Unemployment went back up to 19 percent.

In the end, the New Deal was not the answer to the Depression. That answer came in the form of a war: first supplying Europe, then sending the US military to world war two (WWII).

According to Patrick Renshaw the US spent $321 billion on WWII, more than its total spending from 1790-1940. Unemployment fell to 1.2 percent.

Imperialism

The New Deal took place in the age of imperialism. India, Africa and much of southeast Asia were colonies. The Philippines and Cuba were US possessions. Other lands that the US had taken – Puerto Rico and Hawaii – still are.

In the Arab world, the British sponsored the House of Saud, dismantled and subordinated the economies of the Levant and Egypt.

By the time of the New Deal, the US empire was pushing the British empire out of the fossil fuel-rich Middle East.

In 1945, Roosevelt met the Saudi king at Great Bitter Lake in the Suez canal, moving Saudi Arabia into the US’ system.

What economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler call the “weapondollar-petrodollar” global economy was established.

Stimulus

The Saudi dictatorship would ensure that the price of oil would favour the US, which would get back what it paid for the oil in weapons sales.

The hundreds of billions of dollars of sales of military hardware would be conducted in US dollars, the reserve currency of all the world, which enabled the US to print money and accumulate wealth at the expense of every other country.

While ending fascism was necessary, it paved the way for a US economy built on conflict. It is an empire based on endless war and fossil fuels. Climate change is just one of its life-destroying consequences.

Underpinning this system is a regime of permanent US warfare that has killed millions in the decades since the New Deal, including the dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan, the high-tech destruction and aerial bombardment of Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Yemen and other countries, covert operations in every country in the world, and the imminent threat of nuclear catastrophe.

In making the US the wealthiest society in human history, the stimulus of the New Deal played a much smaller role than the stimulus of WWII.

Protection

The long-term wealth of the US was guaranteed not by either stimulus, but by the consolidation of a global empire with the US at its centre.

Given this context, can the New Deal be divested of its racist and imperialist baggage and reinvented to save the world from climate catastrophe?

At the end of The Green New Deal and Beyond, Cox suggests a series of ways that a Green New Deal could include justice for the financially and energy-impoverished peoples of the world.

This starts not with greening the US military, as Elizabeth Warren suggested on the US campaign trail, but with disarming and dismantling it, as well as the militarized police in the US, both of which are disastrous fossil fuel consumers while also being implicated in persistent human rights abuses.

Protecting and expanding Indigenous land bases, as discussed in documents like Red Nation’s Red Deal or the work of the late Arthur Manuel, will not only redress some of the horrors of colonialism, but also reduce carbon emissions from land use.

Constraints

In some places – like Haiti or the Democratic Republic of Congo – the use of energy will actually have to increase for there to be any economic justice.

If we are going to have to discard baggage one way or another, internationalists might find more interesting experiences and tools from a study of the Five Year Plans of communist China and the Soviet Union and of India when it was socialist, some of whose experiences have been discussed in Salvatore Engel di Mauro’s new book, Socialist States and the Environment.

These countries’ economies and polities have had many flaws, and their planning processes have had many errors, all of which have been amplified by Western propaganda as efficiently as the West’s colonial genocides and massacres have been minimised by the same.

But it may be productive to study how vast, poor countries devastated by imperialism tried to plan for development within severe constraints – including the hostile US empire.

Article: sanctions as a weapon targeting development

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Sanctions as a weapon targeting development

[What follows is a short article which I wrote for a US sociology of development newsletter – specifically, SECTORS: Newsletter of the American Sociological Assocation’s Sociology of Development section. I was asked to write it by Jeb Sprague, whose writing many of you probably know. This article appeared in the Fall 2020 edition and it occurred to me that it might be of interest to some on this mailing list as well.]

The United Nations is currently sanctioning groups in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali. Sanctions in Non-African countries include Iraq, Yemen, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Lebanon, and North Korea. The Security Council states that “since 1966, the Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti, Iraq (2), Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Liberia (3), DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Lebanon, DPRK, Iran, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and the Taliban.” None of the sanctioned countries are developed countries to begin with – sanctions devastate their capacities for future development.

The UN says that “sanctions measures, under Article 41, encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force.” The deadliness of UN sanctions, however, cannot be disputed. The sanctions regime imposed on Iraq after the US bombing of the country in 1990/1 was acknowledged to have killed 500,000 children by 1996, when Madeline Albright famously told 60 Minutes that she thought the price was worth it. Guttman et al. (2019) found that a UN sanctions episode lowered a country’s average life expectancy by 1.2-1.4 years, reduced the targeted countries GDP by 25%, increasing poverty and income inequality. The main mechanisms for this reduction: child mortality, cholera deaths, and decreased resources for public health spending. These aggregate statistics disguise some very grim specifics.

The list of countries under unilateral sanction by the US (or the US plus any coalition it can build for the purpose of punishing a regime) is much longer than the UN list – which countries the US sanctions as well. In addition, the US Treasury site lists financial sanctions details for the Balkans, Belarus, Burundi, the Chinese military, Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria, and Zimbabwe. Up until 2012, when Guttman et al. (2019) study period ended, unilateral US sanctions were less deadly than UN sanctions (shortening life expectancy in the targeted country by an average of 0.4-0.5). The deadlier sanctions are UN sanctions.

It is one of many paradoxes of today’s world order that the United Nations, the body responsible (through its Security Council) for the deadliest sanctions also produces the most eloquent reports (through its Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) on the ill effects of proliferating unilateral sanctions. The Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Economic Measures, Idriss Jazairy, has produced five reports on the matter to date. The latest (a report to the General Assembly presented July 5, 2019) specifies violations of human rights stemming from these sanctions regimes:

  • US sanctions against Iran violate UN Security Council resolutions, deprive Iranians of relief, have been complied with “unduly” by the European Union such trade has virtually collapsed between Europe and Iran. Sanctions have devastated Iran’s food security (Hejazi and Emamgholipur 2020), its health system and ability to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic (Takian et al. 2020), even its long-term scientific capacity (Butler 2019).

  • US sanctions against Cuba have “shattered” the normalizing relations that began in 2017, violate agreements between the US and Europe, and “exert a massive toll on the Cuban economy.”

  • US sanctions against Venezuela have played, in the colorful UN prose, “a non-negligible role in crippling the economy.” The rapporteur cites Weisbrot and Sachs (2019), who showed that tens of thousands of Venezuelans have died as a result of these sanctions, and millions have been displaced.

  • US sanctions against Russia, the rapporteur complains, “have unintended effects, including boosting the domestic (indigenous) capabilities of Russian industries and the agricultural sector to the detriment of Europe.” And also, sanctions have caused price increases that hurt workers.

  • Israel’s blockade against Gaza “constitutes collective punishment of the people of Gaza, contrary to article 33 of the Geneva Convention.”

  • The US and EU sanctions against Syria, openly proclaimed as being part of a strategy of “isolating the Assad regime”, “is a crude admission of disregard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, human rights and humanitarian law.” They have a “catastrophic impact on the Syrian economy and population.”

  • The US-UK-Saudi blockade on Yemen has the rapporteur noting “with concern that the flow of essential foodstuffs and other commodities into Yemen continues to be restricted de facto, even though the naval blockade was lifted after the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen was set up.” This is a particularly euphemistic, given the genocidal nature of the assault on Yemen (e.g. Bachman 2019).

Sanctions against Russia and China are part of a broader US strategy: with these sanctions, the US hopes to isolate targeted countries from potential sources of military aid (e.g., Russia’s aid to Syria) or investment (e.g., China’s investments in Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, or various targeted African countries). These sorts of US strategies can never be isolated from questions of international development. Sanctions regimes represent the most profound weaponization of development: targeted economic isolation to punish populations by inflicting mass mortality through starvation and preventable disease, all the while destroying future economic prospects.

References

Bachman, J. S. (2019). A ‘synchronised attack’ on life: The Saudi-led coalition’s ‘hidden and holistic’ genocide in Yemen and the shared responsibility of the US and UK. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 298–316. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1539910

Butler, D. (2019). How US sanctions are crippling science in Iran. Nature, 574(7776), 13–15.

Gutmann, J., Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2020). Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap. The Journal of Development Studies, 0(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2020.1746277

Hejazi, J., & Emamgholipour, S. (2020). The Effects of the Re-imposition of US Sanctions on Food Security in Iran. International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 0. https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2020.207

OHCHR | Reports. (n.d.-a). Retrieved November 18, 2020, from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/Reports.aspx

Takian, A., Raoofi, A., & Kazempour-Ardebili, S. (2020). COVID-19 battle during the toughest sanctions against Iran. Lancet (London, England), 395(10229), 1035–1036. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30668-1

Weisbrot, M., & Sachs, J. (2019). Punishing Civilians: U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela. Challenge, 62(5), 299–321. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1638094