Mark Twain’s Killing Train

Every time I give someone my email address, or tell them the title of my blog, I get a raised eyebrow or a shocked look. Now, telling people the title of my first book has the same effect. For that reason, I’ve set up this blog to have “Why Killing Train?” and an explanation about the new book very prominently available on the front page.

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The regressive politics of the Iranian-Canadian Khavari petition

[This article, by Shadi Chaleshtoori and myself, was first published in The Bullet – version with links is there].

The regressive politics of the Iranian-Canadian Khevari petition

Shadi Chaleshtoori and Justin Podur

November 11, 2011

On October 12, members of the Iranian-Canadian community sent a petition to Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney expressing concern about the arrival in Canada of Mahmoud Reza Khavari, the former chairman of the largest Iranian state-owned banking institution (Bank Melli).

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Ultraviolent conflicts

Between economic austerity and riot stories, my reading is out of sync with the headlines. I’ve been reading more about African conflicts, especially very recent and ongoing ones. Specifically:

-Allen and Vlassenroot’s book on the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.

-Jason Stearns’s book on the Congo war, “Dancing in the Glory of Monsters”.

-My friend Lansana Gberie’s “A Dirty War in West Africa” on Sierra Leone, and a book he critiques, Paul Richards’s “Fighting for the Rainforest”.

-Assis Malaquias’s “Rebels and Robbers” on Angola’s civil war.

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Settle in and wait for the coup in Egypt

Most people are interested in something that no one knows or can know: what is going to happen in Egypt? It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future (that’s from Keynes). There are lessons from past revolutions that might help us understand what is happening, but from where I’m sitting, marveling at Egyptian people’s courage and looking at these utterly unanticipated and amazing events, I haven’t said much because I don’t have much to offer the people whose courage made this happen and whose decisions will determine how this all goes. Still, there may come a time in the near future when we can help, and when that time comes the more we understand about these dynamics the better.

So, parallels. The 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising was definitely the first one that came to mind. One thing to remember on that front, if you are feeling impatient: the protests at Tiananmen started in mid-April 1989, and the big massacre that drove them out of the square wasn’t until early June. It seems to me that everything depends on Egyptians’ capacity to stay mobilized and to keep escalating protests. The other major point is that if they lose now, they really lose – the worst violence is after the big demonstrations, not during them, when protesters and dissidents are hunted down.

One I hadn’t thought of came from Bill Blum, who made the comparison with Portugal 1975 in his “Killing Hope” column:

“The visual symbol of the Portuguese “revolution” had become the picture of a child sticking a rose into the muzzle of a rifle held by a friendly soldier, and I got caught up in demonstrations and parades featuring people, including myself, standing on tanks and throwing roses, with the crowds cheering the soldiers. It was pretty heady stuff, and I dearly wanted to believe, but I and most people I spoke to there had little doubt that the United States could not let such a breath of fresh air last very long. The overthrow of the Chilean government less than two years earlier had raised the world’s collective political consciousness, as well as the level of skepticism and paranoia on the left.”

“Washington and multinational corporate officials who were on the board of directors of the planet were indeed concerned. Besides anything else, Portugal was a member of NATO. Destabilization became the order of the day: covert actions; attacks in the US press; subverting trade unions; subsidizing opposition media; economic sabotage through international credit and commerce; heavy financing of selected candidates in elections; a US cut-off of Portugal from certain military and nuclear information commonly available to NATO members; NATO naval and air exercises off the Portuguese coast, with 19 NATO warships moored in Lisbon’s harbor, regarded by most Portuguese as an attempt to intimidate the provisional government. In 1976 the “Socialist” Party (scarcely further left and no less anti-communist than the US Democratic Party) came to power, heavily financed by the CIA, the Agency also arranging for Western European social-democratic parties to help foot the bill. The Portuguese revolution was dead, stillborn.”

Blum has good reason to worry, but events don’t always go Washington’s way. If they did, Egyptians wouldn’t have made it this far, and if they go further and keep their resolve, the US won’t have unlimited options. Of course they’ll try to subvert anything decent – but that doesn’t mean nothing decent can happen.

There’s Iran 1979, which Juan Cole did a good blog about.

There’s Venezuela 2002. This wasn’t a revolution though, to overthrow Chavez, but an attempted coup. What’s interesting here is the contrast in the US reaction. Everybody’s seen “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised”, right? Remember how there was a setup, in which coupster snipers attacked the crowds, killing pro- and anti-Chavez demonstrators, and news companies manipulated the footage to suggest that Chavistas killed the demonstrators? In that situation, the (false) claim that pro-Chavez forces killed 10 demonstrators (a number it seems selected in advance by the coupsters) was enough to convince the US that Chavez was a human rights violator who had to go (the whole movie is on Google Video). Take a look at around minute 30 for the incident, and 49:05 for the White House spokesman’s statement, which is too good to not quote at length:

“We know the actions encouraged by the Chavez government provoked this crisis. The Chavez government suppressed peaceful demonstrations, fired on unarmed peaceful protesters resulting in 10 killed and 100 wounded. That is what took place, and a transitional civilian government has been installed.”

Haiti 1986. Another interesting case, because mobilizations took years before they overthrew Duvalier (Egyptians have actually been struggling for years, but not on this level). I was reading Michel Trouillot’s excellent book about the Duvaliers (Haiti: State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism, 1990, pg. 224-5)

“For different reasons, the US government, the CNG, the Haitian urban elites, political parties of all tendencies, and large chunks of the Haitian masses have fancied the assumption that Baby Doc’s departure was a clear step on the march to democracy, an immediate and inevitable consequence of the disturbances and massive riots of 1984-5. To be sure, the riots were a necessary factor in the end of the Duvalier dynasty: had the Haitian masses not defied the army and militia with their bare hands during a month of daily encounters in which many unarmed citizens were injured and killed, chances are that Jean-Claude Duvalier would still be ruling the country. But if the riots were necessary for Duvalier to leave, they certainly were not a sufficient condition for him to depart the way he did. It took something else to orchestrate his departure at that particular time, under those specific circumstances, and with a no less specific aftermath… Two series of events occurred on February 7, 1986: first, the departure of Duvalier; second, the takeover of the state machinery by a group of apparently disparate individuals, civilians and career army officers… For what Haitians witnessed on February 7, 1986, was not the disorderly escape of an ‘entire leadership’ pushed out by popular pressure… but a transmission of power, orchestrated with absolute order – albeit against the background of a pouplar uprising.”

Trouillot refers (on pg. 226) to “one crucial fact: Jean-Claude Duvalier was brought down by a high-level coup d’etat executed with international connivance.” The coup prevented the complete uprooting of the structures of the dictatorship, and a series of dictators continued to rule the country for years, a scenario many, like Samir Amin, have foreseen for Egypt.

Of course, the best thing about this situation is that it isn’t a repeat of anything that has happened in the past. It is the Egyptians’ moment, and they will make it.

Justin Podur is Toronto-based writer.

Spinning the leaks

My daily routine these days includes going to the Wikileaks twitter feed (twitter.com/wikileaks), which took me to this story in the UK Guardian about how Saudi Arabia proposed an Arab force to invade Lebanon. The Guardian is definitely the best site on the Wikileaks, and for data in general – they have understood something about what media organizations should be doing and they are going about it, in ways that a lot of other outlets haven’t.

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Wikileaks Cablegate

The US Embassy cables put out by Wikileaks are not the truth. Even though I knew it, a part of me was disappointed at how ideological some of the cables were. Take #09TELAVIV1060, “Rep. Wexler discusses Iran with IDF Intelligence”. The entire discussion is about the threat posed by Iran to Israel. Even among themselves, even when they think their communications are secret, they engage in fear mongering. Much of the cables are this sort of exchange of opinions. It is only when these opinions are given to journalists at press conferences or in anonymous phone interviews to become “US officials said” that these kinds of speculations take on the appearance of facts.

For those paying close attention, the views expressed in the cables belong to the same world view that these same officials express in the media. Following events in Israel/Palestine without any access to any secret cables, one would be led to the conclusion that the US and Israel have the same kinds of obsessions (control of the region, Iran) with very minor differences between them (none of which differences benefit the Palestinians). So, when the Tel Aviv Embassy (#09TELAVIV1060) cables that “Rep Wexler stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised by the President’s acceptance of all possible options in regards to Iran”, it isn’t a big surprise.

At times, however, the cables do show that US diplomats sometimes have an accurate understanding of situations – which the US proceeds to not use. For example, #09ISLAMABAD2295, relating to the US desire to fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s border areas. “Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan without finally achieving the goal.” Of course, the US response since has been – increased unilateral operations in those areas, which have destabilized the Pakistani state, alienated the civilian government and the military leadership…

So, the data aren’t going to reveal that the US was actually trying to act benevolently in the world, nor that the US actually tells the truth in its dealings with its own public or with other countries. They aren’t going to reveal that US Embassies don’t spy or plot coups. Instead, they will show just what US officials have been up to, what they have been thinking, and what they have been reporting for years, most of which could be inferred by the effects of the actions and by reading between the lines of their stated claims.

Why, then, has the US (and Australia and Canada, with people like Tom Flanagan ready to make ugly statements on behalf of the powerful) seemingly up and lost its mind over this, with the suspected leak Brad Manning in jail with politicians calling for his execution and Wikileaks founder Julian Assange on the run (with people like Flanagan flippantly calling for him to be killed)?

The claims that the information “puts people at risk” are preposterous and have been answered many times over (the people who show such concern over putting people at risk include those who ordered the mass murders that are recorded in the relevant databases). Should states be allowed to keep such things secret? Why? Because they know better than the people? If they do, shouldn’t our access to their secret data lead to us admiring and respecting them more? And if it doesn’t, shouldn’t they be able to explain why, give us the context we are missing? Or is the implicit argument that they are so vastly smarter than we are that we just can’t understand why they have taken these decisions – on our behalf? That is a pretty insulting idea, but without it, the case against the leaks falls. Either their decisions can hold up to scrutiny or they can’t. A look at the data itself is the best way (perhaps the only way) to see the falsehood of the “national security” pretense. The value of that line of argument depends on us not knowing and not being able to find out. One positive outcome of these leaks could be that more people don’t buy the “national security” idea as a reason we don’t have the right to know things.

But if it isn’t out of some kind of legitimate safety concern, why is the US and its allies trying to punish the publication of information as if it was a crime on par with their aerial bombings and financial destruction of economies? The indispensable Jonathan Cook writes that the fact that the leaks happened, as well as the content of the leaks, give the “impression of a world running out of American control”. I think the implications might potentially be even greater than that. What if these leaks set the precedent that governments cannot keep their information secret? That whatever they do, they have to do openly and under scrutiny? That data on their actions is going to be available and analyzed? A great deal of what the US has done that is revealed in these leaks (the Afghan War Diary, the Iraq War Diary, and the Cablegate Cables) after all, it has done openly and with the consent of at least a plurality of its population. So why keep some of it secret? Perhaps because it feared that if the information wasn’t secret, it wouldn’t be able to get away with it. That is an encouraging thought. Governments should fear doing things they can’t justify, and people should have the information to know what they are doing. If the US can take Wikileaks down and terrify others who might try the same, a very interesting moment will be lost. Defend the leaks and use the data.

Postscript

I spent some time (and plan to spend more) looking at the Iraq War Diary data. My impression was that the redaction was excessive. The cablegate cables don’t look overly redacted, which is positive. I hope the unredacted data are released eventually. I am not sure about Wikileaks’s release strategy of a few hundred a day as opposed to the full dump. I understand that there’s so much data that it will be hard to do it justice, but given the intensity of the attack Wikileaks is under, I do fear that the full cables may not see the light of day before the US is successful in stopping it.